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INTRODUCTION
While currently not as volatile as the Middle East or Central America* 
the Balkans have traditionally been a powder keg In International relations 
and still have the possibility of becoming a destahllsing element in the fu­
ture. Wars have started here in the past, and there is no reason to believe 
they will not do so as time passes. Being at the juncture of Europe and 
Asia, the Balkan have served as the crossroads of both traders and armies 
for centuries. They are a microcosm of current international problems—  
housing both Christians and Moslems, developed and underdeveloped economies 
and multiple nationalities all within the same countries* Couple these 
facta with the three different brands of communism practiced by the social­
ist states of Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia, and one has an understandably 
difficult situation to comprehend.
More important for the analyst, however, is the challenge that these 
states have posed to the Soviet Union —  challenges which have succeeded so 
far, in that they have not been targets of overt Soviet military pressure 
to change their ways. This is important in seeing what one state can do 
about an independent foreign policy without the Soviets intervening and can 
ostensibly be used to gauge possible Soviet reactions to similar actions 
taking place within other states.
They also serve as a lesson and a reminder for the Western observer 
that just because a state is opposing Soviet policies it does not necessari­
ly follow that they will openly embrace US policies. Albania has had a
a lo n g s ta n d in g  feud with the S o v i e t s ,  b u t nelthe* la It to
the US* Conversely, just because they are communist countries, it does 
not mean that their views and those of the West will not converge on 
various issues* Thir may he difficult for the Cold Warrior with a strong 
belief that “those who are not with us are against usM or that all com­
munists are had* Instead, it forces one to take a harder look at any 
given situation and realise that the US can agree with Yugoslavia on some 
Issues and disagree with Romania on others without major damages to mutual 
relations*
So we look at the Balkan states of Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia 
with the purpose of learning more about this area of the world and perhaps 
applying it to other situations in the world at another time. The first 
question to examine is why did each of these states individually assert 
their Independence from the Soviet Union* Secondly, how could they do this 
with relative impunity, when Hungary and Chechoslovakia were severely re­
buked In their challenges to and changes of the system within their coun­
tries* Finally, by far the greatest portion of this paper, since achieving 
these more independent positions, what actions have they taken and how far 
have they gone to test this enhanced autonomy from the Soviets* Conversely, 
we may also sec in what ways they have been constrained because of their 
earlier independent steps* We shall, however, focus on the years 1964 to 
1982, when Leonid Brezhnev was head of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union.
We shall first examine why each of these countries decided to begin a
movement towards independence. Many observers believed that these moves
r-:s«
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dislike of the Ruestens. While these are certainly valid secondary 
reasons, t believe that each state had specific and unique reasons for 
taking the steps that they did.
Briefly, Yugoslavia was the first to break with the Soviets and take 
the "separate road*" because of overt Soviet meddling in what the Yugo­
slavs and Tito son as their private* internal affairs. This pragmatic 
nationalism practiced by the Yugoslavs caused a fissure which was widened 
by Soviet charges of Yugoslav revisionism and ultimately led to the cele­
brated Tito-Stalin break of June 1948. There have been attempts at rap-
* «
prochement on both sides since that period, hut the Yugoslav leadership 
has essentially remained independent* following a pragmatic* semi-oppor­
tunistic* and at times widely divergent line in foreign and trade policies 
from that of the Soviets.
The next major split occurred in 1961* when the Albanians condemned 
the Soviets (especially Khrushchev) for "Revisionism*" the deatalinisation 
program and the "goulash" communism then being practiced. They used China 
as their guide and severed all ties with the Soviets once the Slno-Soviet 
dispute became public and irreparable. They were also concerned about a 
Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement at that time and feared that a hostile Yugo­
slavia could harm the now Isolated Albania. Essentially* the only items 
exchanged by the Albanians and Soviets since that time have been heated 
salvos in their respective radio and news reports.
Finally* the Romanians began showing signs of rebelliousness in the 
early 1960s* under the leadership of Ceorghiu-Dej * when Khrushchev began
calling far greater economic integration
for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). Me proposed a system 
of economic specialisation in which states would emphasise the production 
of goods in which they had an advantage. While this may have been econom­
ically sound (specialisation and elimination of wasteful and unwise diversi­
fication), politically it was a blatant attempt to bring each East European 
state to the USSR - which would then be solely responsible for the exchange 
and delivery of the goods. In his scheme, Khrushchev saw the Romanians as 
suppliers of raw materials (oil, timber, uranium and other minerals) and es­
pecially agricultural goods. Dej, and later Ceaucescu, however, deemed it 
in their country’s best interests to start to industrialise the nation ra­
pidly. Under Khrushchev’s plan, however, they would be forever underde­
veloped and industrially deficient. Therein lay the problem.
The Romanians delivered i kr famous ’’independence Declaration" of 
April 1964 in which they declared that communist states should only involve 
themselves in the economic affairs of another country on the basis of "ful­
ly equal rights, observance of national sovereignty and interests, mutual 
advantage, and eonradUy assistance." * A single, supranational economic 
policy ran against their ideas that all socialist countries should be brought 
into Comecon, and they should allow free trade with the West so as not to 
isolate themselves from the world economic community. This was later ex­
panded Into the concept that no single country had the right to claim that 
its beliefs are the general ones for the development of socialism.
The general position stated in the Declaration was one very similar to 
the policy followed by the Yugoslavs, but it was not an outright rejection
of the Soviet system or model* ft instead called let netieail autdftcsly 
to decide how and with whom Romania would trade* While this upset the 
Soviets, Khrushchev was in no firm position to react to it at the time, 
as we shall later see, and it was allowed to stand* This laid the founda­
tion for Ceaucescu's later moves at greater autonomy in foreign policy and 
trade*
So, while nationalism (along with other factors to be discussed later) 
played an Important role in each of the state’s decisions to break with or 
distance themselves from the Soviet ’Jnion, each ultimately had its own spe­
cific reasons for so doing* For Yugoslavia, it was Soviet interference in 
domestic affairs that resulted in development of a pragmatic nationalistic 
course. In the case of Albania, it was —  in their view —  the ideological 
deviations of the Soviets that led to the Chinese and Albanian break with 
the USSR, and the potential for hostility from their neighbor, while the 
Romanians clearly wanted to Initiate a drive for economic development which
the Soviets were, in effect, trying to stifle*
As we have seen, these countries had either broken with the Soviets
or had laid the initial groundwork for so doing before the time period that 
we shall be covering had started —  that is the years that Leonid Brezhnev 
was the leader of the Soviet Union* But we should also examine our second
question, how were these countries able to initiate their independent moves 
without inciting Soviet wrath? We shall first look at the early period of 
these movements and then, once into the major portion of the paper, ye shall 
refer to more recent reasons why they have reached their positions with a
fair amount of success
Closely tied to this question is that of how the** individuals and
governments wets able to decide that their positions were strong enough 
to attempt these m&tiuevers and what enabled them to achieve these sup­
posedly secure positions* (Presumably the Hungarians and Czechs felt 
they were secure enough to initiate their changes.) What indications 
did Tito, Hoxha and Guorghlu-Dej and Coauceacu have that even allowed 
these independent ideas to enter their minds? Again, not all examples 
will fit for all three nations, but they will fit the majority of the 
cases.
To begin with, both Yugoslavia and Albania overcame fascist Nasi 
oppression largely through their own efforts. The partisan guerilla 
efforts developed by the Yugoslavia played the dominant role in saving 
their country (and in organising a similar movement in Albania), through 
which ultimate liberation was indigenous and not, as in the case of the 
other East European nations, a result of Soviet "liberation" and occu­
pation troops.
Similarly, the communist party movements were, for the most part, 
homegrown and not Hoscow-dtreeted implants. Because of this, the early 
results of communist governments came about because of a higher degree 
of early popular support than in the other East European states. The 
people were more willing to support the actions of local officials who 
would, theoretically, be more willing to have the interests of their people 
in mind than would Moscow trained puppets. A higher degree of early popu­
lar support played a major role in giving Tito and Hoxha indications that 
their actions would continue to receive this popular support if the people*
interests were being served, T H s  situation, however, does not hold in 
tfte case of Romania which collaborated with the Nazisand was then occu­
lt** by the Soviets. The party in Scania was also Moscow directed, hot 
r^ $ y : on showed reaflessitcms at being under the gremlin’s thumb.
In all three countries, there was a great deal of party cohesion 
and party support for the actions of the leaders, Hie party leaders (Tito, 
pNitn and Ceuuceseu)* had consolidated their control over their parti#* 
nUt -had eliminated major potential dissenters and threats to their post*. 
Convinced of and seoure in their firm party foundation and organisation, 
tlm lenders had a greater degree of leeway within which to pursue original 
Jarddpi* And trade pelicies. They had strong support and could react more 
dMcdbutelff knowing that, set the whole, their party was behind them. Here* 
fact that the communist party was indigenous —  the case with 
;|(B|pp§^aftd Yugoslavia and strong-willed —  in Romania’s case —  caused
« * « < . * ■
.'§idisf£fe cohesion within the party.
Related to these fac tors is an even more interesting and potentially 
one: nationalism. Each of these Balkan states is known for its
traditional enmity with its neighbors (Albanian distrust of the Yugoslavs* 
the periodically violent hostilities among the Yugoslav national groupings) 
but, even with these differences, many share one trait —  an historical 
dislike of the Russians, This feelings is strongest in Romania, where 
ipMnathy toward the Russians wan aggravated by the Soviet "seizure” of 
Romanian province of Bessarabia (now the Soviet region of Moldavia) 
end of World War IX. The anti-Russian sentiment is so strong that
'they.rapidly closed tin* Maxim Gorky Institute (the Soviet information 
enteri, changed the street names hack to their original Romanian names, 
#nd in all cases tried to crradicatc the memories of the earlier Soviet
presence*
Both the At Win Ians ami Yugoslavs point to their self-liberation 
and Partisan efforts with great pride and react with hostility to any 
outsiders attempt to he Utile those wartime un-esses. These strong 
national feelings have, at times, over*ow* divisive domestic problems 
and have been used to unifv the countrv in times of perceived external
Billllih v
a s ; liil
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tltmif immH as the one which wan felt in late 19S8 by the Soviet In* 
of Cssrhoslovakia)* All three leaders are aware of the intense 
mattans1 ^ride felt hy the pettpIe and have capitalized on this to unify 
dsmstties ami shore up their domestic positions. Thus they can 
rely upon them* nai iomti sentiments to show their nation*a r«~ 
standing-up to the Soviet* and, conversely, use the threat 
hostilities t*» smite the nation in times of domestic (or per» 
SmSMtl •.iitmder *hip> trouble*.
lilt -probably vht* mm significant iart or in the ability  of these 
states to hav«> t h* i * independent roads w »a I hat the Soviets at the
times of high*-*t > 1 1■ » ,  <f t net ham* t r*s*p* stationed within any of the 
iommtt ttwrln* ami tin- cat i i* *t period of the split with Yugo­
slavia* same S4»vf«.l at 111 tt v advisors were cepe I led, while Soviet troops 
'immamia atirt the signing of the Austrian State Treaty lit 191b and 
were twmfpm in Albania, these purely physical constraints 
t*|$t«fl*hM the m H M *  tim treat in preventing th^Mr sti*£*ft. In to 
• i f  *bm *U *P  in each **1 the
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Other factors, such as the strategic importance of Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia over these Balkan states, individual domestic situations 
within Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia, the more recent military devel­
opments and others will be examined Inter in this paper. For the present, 
it is sufficient to note that each of the leaders felt that with domestic 
support, party cohesion, nationalist sentiments, and absence of Soviet 
occupation troops, their positions were secure enough to attempt indepen­
dent moves and ostensibly challenge the Soviets. As will be examined 
later, their "challenges11-may not have been as"potentially destabilizing 
as the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but in view of recent Soviet 
actions, some of their moves would have been justification enough for 
punitive measure to be taken. Circumstances resulted, however, in their 
escaping Invasion.
At this point, we have examined the first two points In the purpose 
of the paper —  both why each state asserted independence originally and 
how they were able to carry through with it in the initial stages. Hors 
recent developments In their continuing success at pursuing their policies 
will be focused on later. Soon we shall get to the main thrust of this 
paper and examine the specific actions taken by these states during the 
Brezhnev years and the possibilities for future success. But first we 
need to briefly examine what problems of the Khrushchev leadership resulted 
in the coming to power of Brezhnev and Kosygin; for it was under Khrushchev 
that the fractures with Albania and Romania and the continuing dispute with 
Yugoslavia occurred. This necessary and basic understanding will be the 
focus of the next chapter*
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II. THE KHRUSHCHEV YEARS
The situation within the Soviet Union in early autumn 1964 caused 
many in the Soviet ruling circle to justify a major change in leader­
ship* Taking ad/antage of longterm and widespread dissatisfaction with 
the mistaken policies, actions and excesses of Nikita Khrushchev, a 
group within the Kremlin felt it was time for a change and, accordingly, 
forced Khrushchev out of his leading position and installed a new regime 
under the direction of Leonid Brezhnev and Alexi Kosygin,
Khrushchev had problems from the start. He Inherited a monolithic, 
unwieldly empire erected as a result of Stalin1s distruct of thw Vest 
and was forced to preside over changes in the internal situation and re­
spond to external challenges over which he often had little or no control. 
Although he Initiated the thaw of destalinisation and the slow breakup of 
the rirld, bureaucratic Bystem, his problems, however, laid in the fact 
that he had no definite plan to follow and no new system with which to re­
place the old. To a party, government and people who had grown used to 
Stalin’s iron-willed adherence to plans and rules, Khrushchev1s "half- 
baked schemes" created a seemingly chaotic situation,
In dealing with the West, he appeared a man of bluff and bluster, not 
someone with significant and well-conceived ideas. He seemed callous and 
indifferent to the events which culminated in the invasion of Hungary in 
1956. Here he used the iron hand of the Soviet armed forces to impose his 
will —  unconcerned with world opinion. Yet, as he discovered in 1962 to 
His great embarrassment, Soviet desires ami plans are not always successful
and He was forced to backdown to the U.S. resolve regarding the placement 
of missiles in Cuba,
As the initiator of destalinization, he perhaps unknowingly opened a 
Pandora's box of both good intentions and untold evils. This denunciation 
of Stalin's system caused much instability within the East European states9 
whose extant party and governmental systems had been carbon copies of the 
Stalinist model. The leaders' domestic credibility was a result of Stalin; 
without him and his system, they lost their perceived mandates at home,
New (or rather old and dormant) feelings of nationalism and anti-Russian 
hatred rose again and helped promote a loosening of most ties —  externally 
and internally* While this perhaps bettered the domestic situations of the 
populace* it ultimately hurt the Soviets, Admitting mistakes caused a 
weakening of the Soviet grip over Eastern Europe and also raised questions 
about the Soviet model being the one and true way to achieve total communism.
Probably Khrushchev's biggest single blunder, however, was his hand* 
ling of the Chinese* This actual mishandling led to the breakdown of rela­
tions between the two major communist powers and ended the concept of the 
%orld Communist movement," Numerous factors (which we cannot adequately 
cover in the limited scope of this paper) contributed to the development 
of the Sino-Soviet dispute. One analyst, John W, Strong, quotes a 1971 in­
terview with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, stating that the cause of the 
aplit was Khrushchev's "revisionism" and policies of "peaceful coexistence" 
with the Western world which discouraged "continuing vigorous revolution" 
and the death of capitalism,^
Other actions contributing to the split include the policy of destalinl
zation and acceptance of "differing roads to socialism" announced In 1955, 
the reconciliation with the heretic Tito, lack of Soviet help in Chinese 
attempts to obtain nuclear weapons, conflict over the respective roles to 
be played In courting the Third World toward socialist development, and 
the basic personality clashes due to Mao’s distrust of the Soviets, especi­
ally Khrushchev.
By 1960, the breaking point was approaching. Khrushchev sensed this 
and, in an attempt to reassert Soviet dominance and cripple the Chinese 
independent streak, he withdrew all Soviet technicians and their blueprints 
In the summer of 1960, leaving numerous joint projects in various stages 
of completion. The split became public in October 1961 when Khrushchev, 
at the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 
said that the 1956 party line "would not be altered to suit the ’Albanian 
leaders’. . . * or anyone else.’"** This thinly veiled attack on the Chi­
nese —  who, it was assumed, had Albania as a client state —  shocked the 
federate Premier Zhou Enlai and his Chinese delegation. He "responded
^#ith), 'If there are quarrels in the socialist camp, we consider that 
'ifcsy should be settled through bilateral contacts* . * (not) public denun* 
ciations. . • 1 and then walked out of the meeting." (We have focused on 
the Sino-Sovlet dispute because of the relative importance of China to our 
three dissenters. As will be shown later, China became a model and ally 
of all three of the Balkan states at various times during their disputes 
with Moscow.)
Other black marks on Khrushchev's record were his inefficient and
at times, crude handling of foreign affairs, especially those dealing 
with certain East European countries. While he was not responsible for 
Yugoslavia’s split with the USSR in 1948, he did play an important role 
in originally patching up the fractured alliance in 1955 by travelling 
to Belgrade and admitting excesses under Stalin and officially condoning 
Tito’s idea of "separate roads" to socialist development. But due to la­
ter errors, such as Khrushchev’s denunciation of the Yugoslavs at the 
1960 communist conference, the rapprochement was a short-lived one and 
the traditional distancing of the two soon resulted, continuing into the 
early Breshnev years*
As mentioned in the Introduction, Khrushchev’s attempts to have CMEA 
planning more centrally controlled and certain states be primarily sup­
pliers of raw materials did not settle well with the Romanians and resul­
ted in the publication of the April 1964 "Independence Declaration." This 
growing self-assertion on the part of the Romanians, as well as their a- 
biilty earlier to gain the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romanian soil 
in 1958, bothered the leadership within the USSR* They were even more con­
cerned, however, with the loss of Albania to China in the early 1960s*
The 20th Congress of the CPSU (at which Khrushchev made his famous "secret 
speech" denouncing Stalin’s excesses) proved to be the watershed in Soviet- 
Albanian relations* In endorsing the policy of destalinisation, Khrushchev 
had, somewhat unwittingly, denounced the idol of the Albanian party* Not 
only had Joseph Stalin, according to Khrushchev, been wrong, but Josip 
Tito’s model for Yugoslavia (the long-time national enemy of Albania) was 
recognised and condoned* This ideological revisionism led the Albanian
Party of Labor (APL) to denounce the new ways and ally more closely with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC)* Mao’s system was much more in keep­
ing with the Stalinist dictates followed by Albania* (The USSR’s econom­
ic, political and military blockade only encouraged Tirana’s turning to 
BeiJing.)
Khrushchev's loss of Albania, distancing of Romania, failure to re­
concile with Yugoslavia and, most importantly, split with China were rea­
sons enough for the Politburo to replace him* Coupled with other domestic 
problems, they decided it was wisest to replace him with the duumvirate of 
L. Brezhnev and A* Kosygin. The reactions to these events of October 1964 
varied among the independent-minded countries. Albania was glad to see 
her primary enemy toppled from power, but limited herself to restrained com­
ments on how this could effect Soviet revisionism, the USSR’s policies since 
the 20th Congress and the struggles the Albanians had waged against these*
But there were indications that Tirana hoped that there would be a return 
to more Stalinist policies with the new leaders* According to Peter R* 
Priftl, they delayed publishing a "lengthy polemical article on the Testae 
ment of Togllatti, the Italian Communist Party, and the CPSU" in the party 
paper Zeri i Popullit until November 13, 1964 in case they received indica­
tions of change within the Soviet Union* They viewed this month long in­
terval as a crucial one for the Soviets to make an overture toward Albania 
and future policy changes. The new Soviet leadership felt differently or 
was unable to make any major changes at that time, however, and the oppor- 
tunity was lost.
Romania only reacted to the change in leadership by printing the chargss
against Khrushchov and extending congratulations to the new leaders. It 
did not dare comment any further because some of the charges used by the 
Soviets in defense of their actions implied that Romanian problems had 
played a role, albeit a small one, in Khrushchev’s downfall. These charge 
es included disrupting the OMEA by enforcing wrongful distribution of eco­
nomic functions between members, upsetting the Romanians by using the 
friendship oil pipeline —  which was to be built in Eastern Europe —  as 
a "motivating factor," and imposing Khrushchev's views on agriculture on 
the Romanians.
Khrushchev’s ouster caused the Yugoslavs the greatest worries, for 
they feared a turning of Soviet policy against them as a prelude to im­
proving Sino-Soviet relations. They believed that the already unstable 
"normalization" of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR would be 
further jeopardised by the Soviets as they tried to show Beijing they 
were ready to put the past Khrushchevian excesses behind them and try a- 
new to settle outstanding differences in Sino-Soviet relations — one ma­
jor difference being the policies toward the heretic Tito. These fears 
soon proved groundless and, by year's end, Tito declared that relations 
continued on a friendly basis.
While the domestic positions of the leaders of Albania, Romania and 
Yugoslavia remained stable, they reacted, on the whole, with caution to 
the events in Moscow in October 1964. They realized that the general leni­
ency and freedom experienced under Khrushchev could likely change and that 
a return to Soviet domination and control was possible. They were ready 
to do what was needed to maintain their newly gained "rights," but were
unsure how successful they would be in direct confrontation with the 
Soviets. All they could do was wait and see what signals would soon 
emanate from the Kremlin,
With this cursory background to the situation caused by KbruAbchev, 
which resulted in the widespread disputes with-Albania,. Romania, and 
Yugoslavia, resulting in Khrushchev’s ouster, we can now turn to the 
Brezhnev years and the actions taken by these states to expand upon this 
initial, "independent" groundwork. As Khrushchev was sent to live in si­
lent obscurity, Yugoslavia and the Soviets were at loggerheads, Albania 
had aligned with China and was reviling the Soviets, while Romania was 
beginning to assert itself and say "Nyet" to Soviet interference in its 
domestic affairs.
It is important to have these events in mind when examining the later 
actions taken by each Balkan state and the reactions of the Soviet leader­
ship, The policies followed by the Soviets had changed, but each leader's 
views were tempered in the fires of Khrushchev’s chaos. Brezhnev knew he 
had a delicate situation to deal with and he had to be careful if he was 
to ever rectify the jumble made by Khrushchev, how we turn to his early 
years and each actor's initial steps following the fall of Khrushchev.
■ fe■ it it-M i i  ■ gi: !S:-gg. ■# ■, g :
in, the liiv b r e e h n e v years
Brezhnev and Kosygin inherited, not an empire built by Stalin* but a 
loosely defined confederation of states —  the result of a growing sense 
of independence among the lastern European countries caused by dentalinl- 
nation and the erratic actions of Khr«i«hchev, Upon obtaining their posi­
tions* their primary task nan to consolidate their positions domestically. 
But they eventually had to face the problems presented by a hostile China, 
an extremely wary West and three maverick socialist states. Dealing with 
each required unique, specialised and careful handling.
Prior to the events of October 1964, Romania had staked an Independent 
claim in its foreign affairs. Its relations with China up until 1962 had 
been poor, but then a rapid change began. As relations between Moscow and 
Beijing collapsed, the Romanians used their diplomatic skills to manuever 
and act as mediators between the two colossi who were at odds. In this 
manner, they were able to play one :>ff the other to dramatically improve 
their external situation and at the same time maintain relations with Chi­
na which the Soviets would have disapproved of otherwise. They also took 
advantage of the perceived lack of strong direction within the Kremlin to 
upgrade their relations with Albania to ambassador status (this being a 
logical step in the cultivation of friendly ties with China) and became 
the first and only East European state to do so. Full diplomatic relations 
were also renewed with Great Britain and France by the end of 1963, They 
began voting independently of the Soviets on a few issues in the United
Nations" in the same year and also declined an invitation to a Soviet 
sponsored "summit" on the occasion of East uormany's Ulbrlcht's 70th 
birthday. And indicating that Romania did not think that Khrushchev 
had much time left as" first secretary of the CPSU, they did not invite 
him to Bucharest for the 20th anniversary celebration of Romania’s liber­
ation. However, the Romanians treated all their guests, Russian and Chi­
nese, Albanian and Yugoslav, with equal time and attention.
Romanian foreign policy became one of "independence* not defiance" 
of the Soviets. When they started to increase trade with the West, they 
did not want to cut themselves off from the Soviets, but desired instead 
to have the freedom to trade with whomever thev wished and objected to 
the "exclusive involvement of the >viet Union"^ in their economic re­
lations* they reacted to negative Soviet radio broadcasts regarding this 
>;§a©reased trade with the capitalists by saying they were just following 
.tit examples set by Poland, Chechoslovakia and the USSR in fully expanding 
their trade contacts. In May 1964, Romanian Premier lo« Maurer led an 
economic delegation to the United States to pursue increased trade, and 
similar trade and cultural contacts were made with France, Britain and 
Sweden.
On the Sino**Soviet question, Romania took on the neutral role as 
moderator so as to prevent the "division of the communist world, not to 
establish either the Sueaiana or the Chinese as 1leaders9 of it." For 
example, in February 1964, the Soviets were going to publish a polemical 
attack on the Chinese written by Suelev, the Politburo’s leading ideolo­
gist* with the tmeit support of the eiber East leaders, Romania
asked the Soviets not to publish It and asked the Chinese to end their
polemics, loth parties agreed and China invited Romania to negotiate*
Efforts eventually felt through, but the Romanians did succeed in de-
2laving the publication by almost two months*
III other areas, on July 10, 1964, the Soviets called for a world 
coiamunist party meeting in Moscow on December 15 of that year* Romania 
was against the idea because she knew it would be a session devoted to 
attacking the Chinese Communist Party. Neither she nor Poland responded 
to the invitation. They would go only if all communist parties partici­
pated, and they felt there should first be talks between the Russians 
and the Chinese* This theme of preventing the division of the communist 
world Into oppos tug camps has been r constant one since the early l9Ms* 
Resides Improving the hostile climate between the Soviets sad th& 
Chinese, Dej and Tito initiated early efforts to improve 
lations and met in September of 1967 concernii the joint, Iran Oates hydro­
electric and navigation project on the Danube River* This project was 
called the "most striking example of the 1dilution* of Comecon exclusivl- 
ty," especially if the revisionist Yugoslavs were joining in a major 
project. Also, due to Romanian tenacity and constant battling within the 
organization, Yugoslavia was later admitted into the CMEA with observer 
status* Romania now had an ally of sorts within the CMEA, Yugoslavia was 
somewhat rehabilitated in the eyes of her fellow socialists and events 
truly had gone full circle since 1948 —  or oven 1960.
A more daring move of the Romanians, which caused great consternation 
within the Kremlin, was the support she gave Israel in the Arab-lsraeli
Six Day War in ['Mine lf67. Her refusal to Join the Soviet bloc in its 
pro-Arab 1 im* could have resulted in military intervention of some 
degree, but the time for Intervention —  at least in Romania -- had 
passed, The Soviets waited too long to conceive a plausible reason 
for so doing and she soon would be oeeupled by events in Czechoslovakia* 
Unlike Romania, which was still allied with the Soviets, Albania, 
by 1964, pursued a domestic and foreign policy nearly identical to that 
of the Chinese. It rejected an Improvement of relations with the West 
and instead pursued ideological and political-economic battles between 
the East and West. She caw coexistence with the West as dangerous and 
a contravening of revolutionary principles. The severe break Albania 
had with the Soviets was complete —  no diplomatic ties remained —  ex* 
cept that they continued to engage in some trade, even after the Soviets 
had attempted to topple Hoxha’s leadership by Instituting a nearly total 
blockade of the country. Albania followed the Chinese example in foreign 
policy in the years prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia* It was 
friendly; but it did get Chinese support on one item, Albania hated Yugo­
slavia passionately, because of early attempts by Yugoslavia to absorb 
Albania, and on this matter China acquiesced to Albanian demands. It 
made no major defiant moves against the Soviets during this period, al­
though it did make some contacts with the West and carried on active trade 
with the other East European nations —  except Yugoslavia, of courses 
Brezhnev and Kosygin did make one conciliatory gesture and invited Albania 
to a January 1965 Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) meeting, but Albania 
spurned the offer. She remained essentially isolated from all of Eastern
Europe uhtll the events in Czechoslovakia prevented her from ignoring 
her conBuunlst neighbors.
Albania and Romania had their differences with the Soviets in the 
early Brezhnev years, but the Yugoslav case was slightly different*
After the initial fears of the Soviets possibly turning against Yugo­
slavia to better their affiliation with China, there were no major dif­
ferences until 1967. At that time, relations began to turn over basic 
ideological differences. Certain Yugoslav reforms —  such as the re­
organization of the party and restatement of its political role — ap­
peared to the Soviets to oppose Leninist political doctrine. Also, the 
Yugoslavs had several misgivings regarding a world communist meeting in 
Budapest proposed by the Soviets for February and March 1966. If it was 
to be held primarily to exeomraunicate the Chinese communists, the Yugo­
slavs (like the Romanians) opposed it because it would condemn the "dif­
ferent roads to socialism" followed by the Chinese and it would put the 
Yugoslavs on the Soviet side in a move similar to an earlier "excommunica­
tion1* —  their own in 1948. "There was also the sponsor's insistence that 
the meeting be considered a continuation of the 1957 and 1960 communist 
conferences, and that conclusions reached at the 1960 meeting were there­
fore still valid. These conclusions had included a strongly worded condem­
nation of the Yugoslav party and its program as opportunistic, revisionist,
4subversive, and a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism." This dilemma was secon­
dary, however, to a sudden crisis in April 1968 when "the security and* in­
dependence of Yugoslavia seemed more precarious than at any time since 
Stalin's death."^
The events obviously referred to are those leading up to and cul­
minating in the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops 
(with the exception of Romania), the majority of Which were Soviets 
hiding behind a facade of WTO unity. This crushing of the Prague Spring 
by men who just a year earlier were trying to consolidate their positions 
and find a feasible line to pursue caused great fear and concern within 
Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia and resulted In swift responses from each 
of them,
Ceaucescu and Tito were most concerned because they, through meetings 
with Czechoslovakia’s Alexander Dubcek, had been giving verbal support and 
encouragement to the changes occurring within Czechoslovakia. After all, 
if they could be independent from the Soviets, why should not they support 
others in their attempts at the same? But this time the powers in Moscow 
felt that affairs were getting out of hand a a strong demarcation line 
needed to be drawn. Because of their earlier support of these events,
C luccscu and Tito feared that the Invasion would be taken further to en­
compass their own countries, Tito placed his recently organized people's 
militias on alert, Ceaucescu did the same with his nation's military, and, 
in a surprising show of independent unity, Albania later declared her sup­
port and aid if either Yugoslavia or Romania were attacked. While this 
help was largely symbolic, it did show that all three nations took the in­
vasion seriously and may have caused the Soviets to reevaluate any further 
plans they may have had about widening the scale of the invasion*
The response to the Invasion was equally swift and sure, Tito declared
"the sovereignty of socialist and prog forces all over the world.
Oh the following day the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council called the In­
vasion **a direct negation of the generally accepted principles of inter­
national law and of the UN Charter.
Romania was also quite assertive in its condemnation of the invasion.
By not joining with the Soviets and making it a truly Warsaw Fact action, 
Ceacescu greatly undermined the Soviet position. He communicated to Mos­
cow that the Romanians would vigorously oppose any other invasion attemps 
ano would join with Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet armed intervention 
In Romania. Legislation was passed declaring anyone who collaborated with 
the USSR a traitor to the state* The Romanians sought assurances of Ameri­
can support in order to discourage the Soviets from any planned actions a- 
gainst Romania and "it appears that China promised to help, if Romania were 
invaded, not only by stepping up anti-Soviet propaganda but also by increas-
g
ing the activity at the Sino-Soviet frontier.**
On September 12, 1968 —  just three weeks after the Csechoslovskia in­
vasion —  Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact which ,#had been transformed 
’from a defense pact against imperialist aggression into an aggressive pact 
against the socialist countries themselves.9** Although the Albanians had 
not participated in any WTO activities since their break with the Soviets 
in 1961, this formal withdrawal had significance. China supported this move 
and, as it had with Romania, declared that any movement against Albania 
would be swiftly dealt with. It halted condemnations of the Yugoslavs, 
who earlier had been declared a non-socialist country by the Albanians, and 
began to increase contacts with its neighbor. Because of its fear of Soviet
reprisals against Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania, it continued these
contacts and, by April 1969, "publieally offered to assist Yugoslavia
10and Romania against Soviet aggression.1*
China’s support of the Balkan countries and their moves at distant 
cing themselves from the Soviets was an acknowledged statement of their 
position toward the Soviet actions. And the fact of .China's existence 
and opposition to the Soviets helped, in its own way, to strengthen the 
resolve of Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia to express the outrage that 
they did. All three Balkan states condemned the Soviet invasion in the 
United Nations and voted against Moscow,
.'While the invasion was a military success and reasserted Soviet con­
trol in one country, it also helped to unify the three maverick Balkan 
states. National differences were overcome and Albania Joined with pre­
viously despised Yugoslavia to oppose further Soviet aggression. The 
Soviets lost credibility In the world as a peace-loving nation and 
Brezhnev risked possib'e negative repercussions in his attempts at an 
early detente with the United States, but they felt that the end Justi­
fied the harsh and risky means. Finally, Tito, Hoxha, and Ceaucescu 
had their domestic positions strengthened as they firmly asserted their 
nation's independent stands, defied the Soviets, and unified their coun­
tries in calls to defend the homeland against possible Soviet military 
intervention. The example the USSR set for Czechoslovakia was not lost 
on the other states, but led to a greater, not lesser, push for indepen­
dence within these other countries. This push will be examined in the 
following chapters.
IV, FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS
As we have seen, the Czechoslovak Invasion proved to be the major 
event which strengthened the resolve of Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia 
to pursue their Independent course. But it also demonstrated that a 
great deal of finesse had to be used in order to achieve their goals 
without overirritating the Soviets, The threat posed by the Soviets 
was reinforced by the invasion and each of the states realized how pre­
carious their individual positions were* It proved to be the Impet’’ • 
for these states to begin working together in some areas —  especially 
collective security. They also felt that now was the time to establish 
new ties and for Romania and Yugoslavia at least, diversify their con­
tacts. But each step they took was carefully examined as to possible 
repercussions in Moscow. Nevertheless, greater independent progress 
was made.
The period from 1968 to the mid 1970s saw many opportunities for 
these states to continue pursuing their foreign policies, The Soviets 
were preoccupied by detente with the West and mending fences broken by 
the 1968 affairs, traditional international alliances were being reex­
amined and the Third World was asserting itself as never before. Each 
of the states we are examining took advantage of these new opportunities 
and moved in directions they perceived as being in their own best inter­
ests. At times their policies converged with those of the Soviets, but 
more often they diverged, putting strains on their ties with the Soviets.
In. the following sections, we shall examine the foreign policy ac­
tions taken by Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia in the areas of regular 
international diplomacy, military affairs —  especially concentrating on 
Romania —  and dealings with the Third World, We shall see to what de­
gree they moved away from the Soviets and how they were constrained in 
their moves by Soviet threats —  actual or perceived, Ail three states 
have not acted in unison on all issues and some have not been affected 
to the same extent by certain issues. For instance, Albania has not been 
involved in the nonaligned movement, while Yugoslavia has been an especi­
ally active member. Conversely, neither Albania nor Yugoslavia was in­
volved in WTO activities during this period, but Romania was especially 
concerned by WTO actions. However, all actions taken together for this 
period point to a definite movement toward greater autonomy for all of 
these socialist Balkan states. Whether this has continued in recent years 
(or will continue in the near future) will be examined later. At this 
point we are merely ascertaining the degree of autonomy achieved between 
1968 and the mld-70s.
The first part of this section will concern the international diplo­
macy actions of Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia for the period indicated. 
We shall discuss their dealings with Moscow, Washington, Beijing and the 
European Security Talks in Helsinki, as well as their relations with the 
other East European states and with each other.
In dealings with Moscow, Tito and especially Ceaucescu had frequent 
meetings with evict party chief L. Broxhnev, while because of the open 
hostility with Albania, Hoxha never had occasion to meet with Breshnev,
These meetings were held primarily to keep open the lines of communica- 
tion —  a wise diplomat 1c move no matter what the state of tension be­
tween two nations —  yet they were at times less than productive. For 
example, unlike the meetings with the other bloc members --where com­
plete unity of views was announced, "the December 23, 1972 meeting be* 
tween Brezhnev and Ceaucescu in Moscow was charncterizei bv considerable
coolness and indications of disagreement, , , the meeting with Ceaucescu 
took place 1 in a friendly and frank atmosphere* —  the Soviet code words 
for disagreement,"* Indeed, there were many signs of this occurring even 
earlier because Richard Pipes noted that Romania refused to sign a "semi­
secret ideological cooperation pact*' with the Soviets in 1970,
Another aspect of these dealings with Moscow was the ever present 
threat of the implementation by Moscow of the "Brezhnev Doctrine," a term 
coined by American observers following the Czechoslovakia invasion and re­
ferring to the right of Moscow to intervene in another socialist country’s 
affairs whenever it might be influenced by subversive, counter-revolution­
ary elements* Brezhnev said that the Brezhnev Doctrine was fabricated by 
the West and tried to reassure the Yugoslavs on numerous occasions (in­
cluding trips to Belgrade in 1971 and 1976, as well as during Tito’s trip 
to Moscow in 1979 and even at Tito’s funeral in May of 1980) that he had
a formal commitment to non-interference in Yugoslavia's internal affairs.
Romania, however, was keenly aware of its limits and tried to avoid 
implementation of tbb Brezhnev Doctrine at its expense. But military in­
tervention was not discounted altogether. "Yugoslavia’s independent for­
eign policy, like Romania’s, is designed primarily to protect the nation’s
independence and has been characterized by prudence and avoidance of
direct confrontation with Mosc»w."* This concept Is a key to the
Yugoslavia and Romanian foreign pol icies, "The Romanians (and I would
argue, the Yugoslavs) have rarely antagonized the Soviet Union and her
allies for the sake of antagonism. Rather, the tension and conflict
spring from the unwillingness of the Romanian Communist Party to sub-
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sume Romanian interests to Soviet or bloc interests." And in a manner 
befitting the maverick member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania had the care­
ful audacity, according to Karen Dawisha, to move to "selective coopera-
■ 5 'tion with the network of relations of the CMEA and Warsaw Pact.1*
Some believe that Yugoslavia, rather than becoming more independent
of the Soviet Union during this period instead grew closer to the Soviets
There were indications that this was true. The Soviets especially felt
that, though they were still reserved over some of Yugoslavia’s liberal
"heresies," they "(were) taking (their ) chances withYugoslavia serlous-
#6IV am a delegation led by Kirilenko attended a Yugoslav party confer*
t-ih c for only the second time since World War II, Similarly,
In September 1969, Tito was receiving Gromyko in 
Belgrade and later told the world, *We arrived at 
the common conclusion that it Is best to forget 
the past and cooperate on those things which are 
of common interest to us.* What assurances Gromyko 
may have given him we do not know. One thing he 
(Gromyko) did not do was to state publicly that 
the Brezhnev Doctrine did not apply in Yugoslavia. 7
One thing is sure, however, Yugoslavia will never go fully one way or the
other; neither all with the West or all with the Soviets. It has tried
Ml:;;’-;-:,
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..to'normalize relations with the acknowledgement that Yugoslav indepen-
8denee be recognized and has indicated that it will oppose ill threats.
In regards to Yugoslavia, Romania defied a Soviet bloc boycott of 
the Ninth Yugoslav Party Congress in March 1969 when Tito declared that
Yugoslavia was unlsolatable* And although Soviet interest in Yugoslavia
9has increased since September 1971, 'Yugoslavia is the more difficult 
problem for the Russians, both because its reforms have progressed much 
further and because it is less subject to pressure,”*®
Soviet attempts to gain influence since 1971 both In Yugoslavia and 
Albania probably indicate that they have reexamined their policies regard­
ing their position as a Mediterranean power* The Soviet army paper took 
the Yugoslav side in Yugoslavia's quarrel with Italy over Trieste and on 
NATO manuevers in the northern Adriatic Sea and a more understated ”wooing 
of Albania which began with a series of peers articles at the end of NoveM* 
ber 1973.”** All these moves, however, were Soviet initiated and not psrt 
of any Balkan trend toward closer relations, in fact, the early seventies 
saw much dissonance over Hfluhsmlae and Yugoslavian Involvement in the Hel­
sinki talks and in deallugs with the Eutocomraunists.
Both Romania and Yugoslavia saw the talks, which began in 1972, as
important forums from which coBptfies Could be assured security from
the Soviets —  but anlY if to; Id 0& irdepsn*
(ref U*«'t ingV the efforts of all states In finding and In ensuring the
..12 .international guarantees. The Soviets, understandably, were opposed 
to this because there would be a loss of control over the Initiatives 
themaelv.es and of unity in the voting on the proposals.
Hie smaller states, however, go their way and individual initiative 
wa# assured. Romania also pushed for and received a stipulation requir­
ing "prior notice of {military) manuevers involving more than 25,000 men
within 250 km. of national bordersH and one stating that an Exchange of
13military observers will take place,"
Another issue that was particularly resisted by the Soviets and East 
Europeans, but amenable to the Romanians at least, was the Western attempt 
it a ,Mfreer1 flow of information, people jitd ideas. (On this item) Ro­
mania has resisted the least, not because it is any less fearful of what 
the West proposes, but mainly because of its dislike of acting en bloc
14
with the rest of its nominal allies," This intransigence greatly irri­
tated the Soviets, but the Romanians and Yugoslavs were determined to use 
every avenue available to maintain their positions and accordingly played 
important roles In the Helsinki meetings.
The Soviets have also had troubles dealing with the erstwhile Euro- 
communists, those European communist party leaders who are not actually 
In power hut have the potentiality to he so one day and who are determined
$$ d^teilpR i^  Ratty policy, It  ls
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disconcerting to the Soviets who are determined to he the leaders of 
the so-called world communist movement.
For instance, the Soviets had long been trying to convene an all- 
European communist party conference, (especially because the Yugoslavs 
and Romanians had opposed a world conference if it was to be held pri­
marily to punish the Chinese communists). A European conference was 
finally organised In East Berlin in 1976, but the Romanians and others 
forced the Soviets to make concessions in order to get the conference 
held and ensure their attendance. Twenty-nine European parties gathered 
and It became a forum for Romanian expression and defense of foreign poli­
cy autonomy. During the conference* Yugoslavia and Romania joined with 
the Italian and Spanish Communist Parties and formed an informal "South- 
ern axis'1 promoting their viewpoints. And in a direct negation of the 
conference's intentions,1* President Ceaucescu stated, following the con­
ference, that the East Berlin meeting marked a 'fundamental change in the
Communist worker's movement in which there does not and cannot exist a
16guiding center.'" This is a direct negation of what the Soviets had de­
sired to achieve by convening the conference —  a reestablishment of its
eign policy and the absolute right of each party to decide its own course11
and on the need to collaborate with all Mleft!at” parties to create a new 
international order. "This was a reassertion of Romania’s autonomous
stancej particularly following the concilliatory moves it had made toward
- IB :the Soviet Union in the wake of treshnev’s November 1976 visit,” These
continual meetings with the Furocommunists constituted a major thorn in 
the side of the Soviets and only served to demonstrate the continued autono­
mous policies of Yugoslavia and Romania (in this area) during this period. 
There have also been increased contacts with Western Europe and the 
United States. Romania initiated the movement in 1967 when it established 
diplomatic relations with West Germany ,#in defiance of a strict Soviet bloc 
injunction not to do so until Moscow had given its approval,H It also
caused waves when 11 it refused to go along with the Soviet bloc’s pro-Arab
. '.to' ■ ■
line in the June 1967 war (with Israel.)M
All the states! including isolated Albania, began to expand their con­
tacts with the West# Yugoslavia received the Italian president in October 
1969 and encouraged West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in his Ostpolltik 
policies. Although Yugoslavia had some difficulties breaking into the West 
European economy, it eventually concluded a three-year trade agreemnt with 
the Common Market In February 1970, While Romania established contacts
with everyone it could in West Europe, Albania increased ties with Turkey
diplomacy, diplomatic ties with the ten were finally established by 
the end of 1970.
As for the U . S ., Yugoslavia had had contacts with Washington since 
the early 1950s and Romania had sent Marin to Washington on a trade mis­
sion in 1964. Romania and Yugoslavia called upon President Johnson for 
verbal assistance to deter a possible Soviet threat during the events of 
October 1968. While Albania continued to revile the U#S* imperialists, 
Yugoslavia, and especially Romania, maintained close ties in the early 
1970s, Nixon visited Romania in 1970 to great acclaim, while Ceaucescu 
was a guest in the U.S. in 1971 and 1973 and Ford returned the visits in 
August 1975. On each occasion, Romania stressed the importance of many 
ties between the two countries and attempted to downplay differences —  
even when being grilled by U.S. senators on Romanian human rights viola­
tions.
While this increased contact with the West was impressive, the "West­
ern goal of improving relations with the USSR clearly overshadowed that of
assisting Cast Europeans in their efforts to free themselves from Soviet 
20control." Although the West, and especially the U.S,, refused to guaran­
tee outright assistance in the event of a Soviet attack, they did voice as­
surances on the right of nations to live under the rights expressed In the 
UN Charter, which perhaps is what the states desired —  acknowledgement by 
the other superpower o f their rights as Individual states*
ms
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Following the Czechoslovak invasion, all three states received assurances 
from the Chinese that they would provide what defense they could if the 
Soviets took steps against them, although Zhou Enlai later warned that 
nGne does not put out fires with water from a distant well.1' Though the 
Chinese well was indeed a long way from the Balkans, its influence was 
at ill f*11 there and In Moscow. The two communist powerhouses were still 
at odds during this period, which aided in some small way the independent
cause,
Romania, on the surface, chose not to take sides in the dispute and, 
for example, gave both the Soviets and the Chinese 14 1/2 lines in the 
party paper, Scintela, regarding the border clashes on September 13, 1968, 
Romanian and Chinese relations were good beeaaseof early Romanian support 
for China's ally, Albania* China often helped Romania when the Soviets 
were being hostile* For instance, an article in The Economist reported 
that the Soviet Union and Poland reneged on coke deliveries, so the Chi­
nese covered the difference. It also gave much flood relief aid following
the devasting 1972 floods when the Soviets refused to extend further cred-
21
its. (The Chinese were later publicly thanked for their support.) But 
the Romanians were restricted in the types of contacts they could have 
without incurring Soviet wrath. The Soviets would never have tolerated a
Chinese military presence in Romania, although exchanges of military dele-*
It did receive $250 million in credits from the Chinese id there was an
' 23increase in military cooperation that summer , but Romania then became
more sensitive to bloc feelings and initiated slightly higher cooperation
4 /V ■ 2A "with the CMEA and Warsaw Pact.
The Yugoslavs had no real relations with China until Spring 1969 
(following the events in Czechoslovakia), Once Albania saw the danger pre­
sented by the Soviets, however, and initiated contacts with Yugoslavia, the 
Chinese and Yugoslavs began to increase their contacts. (The Chinese had 
been avoiding so doing in deference to Albanian hostilities with her neigh­
bor*) This Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement was a pleasant surprise, according 
to Adam Bromke, They loosened the ties the Soviets were trying to use to
bring Yugosiavia closer and at the same time brought diametrically opposed
25branches of communism together.
Both Yugoslavia and China boycotted the Soviet’s world communist party
conference held in 1969 and Yugoslavia sent a trade delegation to Beijing
that spring, Yugoslavia then became a neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute
(following the Romanian lead) and China responded positively* **In Hay 1970
Bogdan Orescanin present his credentials in Peking*where there had been no
26Yugoslav ambassador since , • • 1958,"
Albania continued to be the primary client state of China and their 
trade, diplomatic and military ties flourished* the Soviets were indeed
relations, but the Soviets changed and became friendlier to the two—  
especially because of fears of a "Balkan Triangle" of Romania, Albania 
and Yugoslavia aided by China. Because of the Soviet change and the 
paucity of tangible help to be expected from China, Yugoslavia and 
Romania began to rethink their policies, "Since 1971, though China has 
maintained its alliance with Albania, its close connection with Romania
and cordial relations with Yugoslavia, its prime interest in Europe has 
been y  * .the West rather than the East*" China, which had initially 
turned to Albania (and the others) because of its relatively isolated po­
sition and need for outside contacts, had begun to emerge and the useful­
ness of these states began to diminish* They maintained strong relations 
and their ideological opposition to the Soviet ideas remained undiluted,
but ail parties had started to expand their contacts.
Unlike the Chinese, who clearly relish the discomfort they cause 
Moscow by maintaining close ties with Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia, the 
other East Buropean states are more cautious in their dealings with these
three states. With few exceptions, they gauge Moscow's feelings towards 
the three and then act accordingly —  unless they are given specific di­
rections from Moscow. Conversely, Albania Is so anti-Soviet that they 
use East European closeness to Moscow as a yardstick; "the warmer their 
relations with Moscow, the cooler Tirana's attitude toward them," As 
a matter of fact, Romania is the only East European state with which it
re4a|iong,
to .-'the Albanians*
Although there have been times when an East European state’s views
have converged with one of the other three —  as when both Romania and 
Poland opposed the. communist conference t > condemn China —  these periods
of public agreement have been rare^ There have hern closer ties develop­
ing between neighbors, however, which fHf emimab 1 v <ause some slight irri­
tation in the Kremlin* For instance, there have been special, twice 
yearly meetings between Ceaueeseu and Bulgaria’s Zhivkov, because of 
"shared Southern concerns"*^, and also a development of closer ties be­
tween Yugoslavia and Hungary, no doubt due in part to a shared border
31and also concerns for the Danube.
But while these Increased contacts may be of concern to the Soviets, 
perhaps Bulgaria and Hungary are Soviet proxies in an indirect dialogue 
with Yugoslavia and Romania. A speech was given eo Hash i9, 1974 by 
Bulgaria’s Zhivkov, for example, on its coordination of "political, 
ecoueatle and military fields" with the Soviets* This caused fears in 
Yugoslavia and Greece about a renewed Soviet activist phase of incorpora­
tion of the Balkans, particularly of Yugoslavia. This may indeed have 
bee* the case, but perhaps it was a trial balloon launched by the Soviets 
indirectly through Bulgaria to gauge Balkan reactions and resolve* 
Unfortunately, It is impossible for the outside observer to know the real
: im im  m- Up* c«iwa^--iy;i8Uoiijf
Any growing sense of cohesion among these three states would undoubted­
ly result in great concern within the Kremlin* And, indeed, there have 
been many Indications of this occurring during the period being examined. 
Albania is again a prime example of this* As mentioned ibove, prior to 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Albania was at odds with all the East 
European states with the exception of Romania. It did not consider 
Yugoslavia a socialist nation and constantly heaped scorn on her neighbor 
Following the invasion, however, a new trend of improved relations de­
veloped between the two, a ’’direct result of Tirana’s increasing fears
33
of Soviet aggression against Romania, Yugoslavia and Albania.” Full 
diplomatic relations were established with Yugoslavia in February 1971 
and incidents in Kosovo —  long an Albanian area of territorial dispute 
with Yugoslavia —  were dealt with calmly because of the new rapproche­
ment. The Soviets could only look morosely at the developments*
Of even greater irritation to the Soviets has been the increasingly 
strong ties which have developed between Romania and Yugoslavia. They 
are fortufiate in not having any outstanding border disputes and their 
leaders have been meeting frequest 1y ever since 1969 when Tito and 
Ceauccscu gathered in their respective border cities and stressed in­
creased multilateral relations between the two states. These relations 
have been on all levels, including the military one, ’’Since W!2 he 
(Ceaucescu) has so intensified relations with Yugoslavia that it is no 
exaggeration to npmk of an itnofficial alliance between these
: ; , lili ■ .'f ill
intervention and joint defense, political and economic concerns* These
// ■; / -Y'''" . vy / /•;' ■ //-Y
meetings In times of crisis indicate an unstated.special understanding —
perhaps with military overtones. The possibilitv >1 such an alliance
may act as an element of deterence to the Soviets. And this does give
36Romania one secure border and staunch ally.
The alliance is so close and mutually helpful that, “The Yugoslavs
have even claimed in discussions with Western officials that they often
participate at various negotiations and meetings of Communist parties
37
merely to support the Romanians,M There are even rumors of an evacua­
tion plan for Ceauceseu to Belgrade and/or Beijing to form, if necessary,
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a government in exile and hinder the Soviets.
That such ideas are even entertained is, at the very least* dla** 
heartening to the Soviets*. /In all, the general trend in A l b a n i a n , . 
an and Yugoslav diplomacy has been one of a greater distancing in their 
policies, if not in their full alliances, from the Soviet Union. Not 
all attempts have* been as successful or long range as were earlier hoped —  
Chinese and American loss of interest in the-areas in the mid-70s being 
a prime example —  but overall indications point to this growing phenomena*
Their ability to move with relative ease in the world community demonstrates 
to what extent their policies of increased diplomatic Independence from the 
Soviet line have succeeded, They have curbed some «>f their more overt ac­
tions when negative feedback is communicated from Moscow, bt*t on the whole
thiiy hmm made steps-
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A strong national defense is a key ingredient for the successful 
achievement of the foreign policy objectives of any state and we new 
turn our attention to the military and defensive arrangements among 
Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia. In the foreign policy section, we 
focused on the defiant moves of each of the states, but here we shall
see both their acts of independence and the steps they took to prevent
intervention. This is .especially interesting because even their actions
towards national defense can be seen as actions taken In defiance of
treaty obligations, in some cases, and the wishes of the USSR on the 
whole. In order to pursue an autonomous foreign policy, a state must be 
able to defend itself from potential aggressors which might differ with 
the State's conception of its policy ,and communicate to the foreign 
power that it is prepared and willing to fight to protect its vital inter­
ests* All three states have done so to varying degrees, Romania being 
the most visible example because of its alliance arrangements. In the 
opinion of the author, it is in this area —  mi i itary policy and relations 
with the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) -- that states, primarily Romania, 
must exercise the greatest caution to avoid overly provoking the Soviets* 
Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the three states 
Immediately put their defense forces on alert, fearing a possible extension 
of the invasion to include any or all of these Balkan states. As was men­
tioned earlier, Albania, which had been a member of the WTO in name only
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since 1961, farwally withdrew the Pact on Sep tender 12* 1968 citing 
fraternal aggression as its justification. Yugoslavia had never been 
part of the VT1D and could not demonstrate its disgust as dramatically as 
the Albanians, while the Romanians felt that such drastic measures were 
unnecessary and dangerous for her to even consider. Instead, major 
changes were made in Romanian military and defense policy, because Ro­
mania, in my opinion, is the most striking example of a balanced p o l i c y -  
still aligned with the Soviets and a meaner of the WTO, yet individual* 
istic in many areas —  we shall focus primarily on Romania in this section. 
*Wiat it Has been able to maintain its ties with the WTO and still be active 
on the world stage speaks to the determination of its people to defend 
their country and lenis support to the government in the pursuit of its 
foreign policy. The volume of information available on Romania, the simi­
lar defensive arrangements in Yugoslavia and the lack of any military in­
formation on Albania are supplementary reasons for this limit.
Because Romania was devoted to increasing economic development and 
decided not to tie up capital in defense spending and it chose a "people's 
war" doctrine which relies on guerrilla war tactics and low-technology de­
fense items* This is also sound strategic planning for a state such as 
Romania which does not have a large surplus of capital to tie up in to high 
technology military hardware. Following the Czechoslovak invasion, Romania, 
which had a similar military policy as Czechoslovakia, decided to review its 
strategy* The Romanians abruptly ended their "collegial and* material lines 
of dependence" on the Soviet armed forces and, in 1969, "the armed forces 
were thoroughly subordinated to the national leadership's control through the
creation of the Defense Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania,"^
Romania has insisted on the right to maintain relations with both 
Moscow and Beijing as part of its foreign policy. Thanks to their suc­
cess in maintaining that position* the Romanians have been able ever 
since to develop their autonomy with a strongly nationalist emphasis* 
including the exclusion of foreign troop manuevers —  as distinct from 
staff exercises —  on Romanian soil since 1965. They even* as mentioned 
earlier* pressed for notice of manuevers within a specified distance 
from a nation’s borders during the European security talks. The Romani­
ans have* however* allowed some Romanian troops to manuever with the So­
viets in order to ease tensions and "go the extra mile*" but there con­
tinue to be areas of disagreement in regards to manuevers*
Following the 1968 invasion* the Patriotic Guards —  a paramilitary 
organization numbering approximately 750*000 men —  were rapidly estab­
lished, Tney felt the need for a new strategic and defense policy which 
was revealed in 1969* during the 10th Congress of the Romanian Communist 
Party* as the "struggle of the entire people." "The struggle of the entire 
people • • • was further developed by the creation of locally dispersed ir­
regular defense units* reserves, people's guards* and youth organizations." 
This policy is defensively* not offensively oriented* as the Romanians see 
the possibility of defending themselves from either a RATO or a Warsaw 
Pact invasion.
At first* the Romanian officer corps balked at this new policy* but 
the majority of them now seem to be strongly supportive of Ceaucescu and
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the Romanian national military policy* Between 1969-1971♦ the Romanians 
shoved themselves ready to defend the country against all imperialist at­
tacks (Soviet as well as Western and voiced opposition to intimidation by 
outside forces* especially through the military paper Apararea Patriel> 
and ’’ready to fight” articles and deciarations. They were not Muffing 
and were willing* it appears* to use all their forces and people to defend 
the fatherland,* While tenuous at first* there are currently good party/ 
military relations* This was achieved through the reorganisation of na­
tional defense in 1972, whereby strong party and state (meaning Ceaucescu) 
control over the military was ensured. The control is maintained through 
thorough ideological indoctrination and sizeable material incentives such 
as higher prestige, pay and other perquisites for military personnel.
There Is great reliance on an appeal to patriotism as well. Consequently, 
the military consistently reiterated its support of the party throughout 
the 70s. ^
The Romanian Defense Law of 1972 is closely modelled on that of Yugo­
slavia and allows for decentralization in case of attack* increased guerilla 
tactics and local militia Initiatives, ’’The Yugoslav doctrine (General 
People’s Defense) . . • has served as a model doctrine for any last Euro­
pean Communist state seeking to secure its political autonomy of the Soviet 
Union and to pursue an independent foreign policy,”^ The Yugoslav forces 
are divided into a 260*000 member elite force called the Yugoslav People’s 
Army and the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) consisting of one million 
troops. They are dispersed and, like the Romanian* need only to delay an
3
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Invader for a few hours in order to mobilize the TDF and prepare for a 
prolonged resistance from the mountainous regions of the country. Yugo­
slav military planners estimate that nearly two million troops would be 
needed for an Invader to occupy the country. As is obvious* the Yugo­
slav and Romanian policies are strikingly similar*
Ceaucescu has maintained effective control of the military and knows 
the' will fight to resist attack* (He counts on this support in making his 
foreign policy moves." This diversity in the military means Romania can 
offer a "prolonged military resistance",^ demoralize and slow down the in­
vaders to keep tuem from one quick, decisive blow* Romania tries to deter 
such an attack by letting any possible invaders know it would be a war of 
attrition in which an estimated million men would he needed to occupy the 
country* (Only the USSR could mobilize such an occupation force*) This 
strategy of bogging down the large numbers of invading troops is similar 
to the guerilla tactics employed by the North Vietnamese, VietCong (and
g
Afghani rebels).
The leaders ensure that defense is a national priority by giving both 
men and women military training in school, where the armed forces play a 
major role in the "political socialization of youth*" In an updated sec­
tion of the 1972 defense law, the Romanian Grand National Assembly developed 
a national defense committee and called for the mobilization of ail men be­
tween 20 and 60 and all women between 20 and 53 years of age* Military duty 
is compulsory for all citizens —  male and female —  for 16 months after 
which they must enter a paramilitary reserve like the Patriotic Guards. In 
1978, there were approximately 502,000 reservists. "Clearly, the Romanian
4$
defense concept is that men, and not machines, will be decisive in a war 
of aggression against
On a cost-benefit basis, the government believes that the current 
policy of low capital intensity and high cost efficiency is the best poli­
cy. This will probably not change because of the stress on industrial de­
velopment and the high costs of new military technology* Also, Ceaucescu
believes that "economic development and social modernization are the only
i#llsure defenses for the socialist state in particular*"
Regarding military spending, Romania ranks (within the WTO) fifth out
of seven countries in total military expenditures and seventh in military
■ 12expenditures as a percentage of CNF and per capita (1978 figures)* As 
for arms development, they have increased domestic manufacture of arms 
from 27% of the total in 1965 to 66% in 1975 and they have diversified 
their sources of arms to include China, France, Great Britain and Israel, 
as well as the Soviet Union* For instance, between 1965 and 1974, "China 
supplied Romania with $14 million of military equipment or 2.6 percent” of
the total, while it "Is estimated that * . « , Albania received $77 million
14in Chinese arms*" And, in a joint action with Yugoslavia which demon­
strates development of new military ties and a subtle act of defiance of
the Soviets, the Romanians have developed a joint twin-jet, multipurpose
15aircraft —  the •Orao* —  with the Yugoslavs*
Besides independent production and purchase of military hardware, the 
Romanians have also taken direct steps to assert military independence of 
the Soviets* For instance, a Romanian law was enacted which limited the 
powers of the Warsaw Pact by stating that only the Grand Rational Assembly 
had the right to decide if the world situation requires the involvement of
m
Romanian troops In a WTO action. Similarly, the Soviets must get ap­
proval from the Romanian Assembly to cross Romanian territory "and * on 
the few occasions that Soviet troops were allowed to cross Romania. • •
they were required to travel unarmed, their weapons carried separately
17on freight trains.,,# The Romanians ala' refused to allow the Soviets 
to build a wlde-gauge railroad from the Soviet Union to Bulgaria in 1974 
because it could have been used to carry Soviet troops into Romania dur­
ing an invasion.
Additionally, the Romanians asserted this dissident policy soon after 
the Czechoslovak Invasion when on July 8, 1970, in the Romanian treaty of 
friendship and mutual aid with the Soviet Union, they affirmed their mili­
tary autonomy, did not include a section on fraternal obligations to the 
defense of socialist achievements and agreed only to "consult'1 on foreign 
policy issues.***
Romania has also had its differences with the Warsaw Pact. Besides 
not joining in manuevers with the Pact, the Romanian representative to the 
1970 Geneva Disarmament Conference proposed that they prohibit the manue- 
vering of troops from one country taking place on the territory of another. 
"And the Romanian U.N. Ambassador Gheorghe Diaconescu attempted to include 
in the definition of aggression wording that would have defined the term
19to include action against a state by members of Its own alliance system." 
The Romanians only participate in the WTO political and military command, 
primarily to gain military intelligence. They disagree with the position 
that the Cominder in Chief of the Pact must be a Soviet general, refused 
to raise their share of the defense budget in 1978 (we shall discuss this 
later in greater detail) and are opposed to maintenance of "military bases
■" 16
By including NATO inand alliance systems such as NATO and the WTO."
the condemnation! they understandably avoided raising the ire of the
Soviets in an unbalanced attack on just the Soviets.
Also, at "the 1974 Political Consultative Session of the Warsaw Pact,
Romania had proposed the creation of a committee of foreign ministers*11
It continued to press for this in 1975 and 1976. This9 along with rumors
that Romania was seeking arms from the West increased Sovlet-Romanian dis- 
21agreement. Several scholarly Soviet articles questioning the right of 
Roman's to certain parts of her territory, following a visit by Soviet 
General Yepishev in June 1976f and rumors m  Soviet troops moving near the 
Romanian border, shows that the Soviets realized that some Romanian moves 
toward nutonor** had military implications, viewed them as a challenge and 
indicated its disapproval. It also shows that the Soviets were not disin­
terested in Roman lari moves in the mid-seventies. Soviet manuevers served 
as a reminder of the Soviet presence and mild disapproval of Romanian in­
tentions, but while not for intervention purposes, they were asserting
22their capability of intervening*
The Romanians were cognizant of this capability and kept a mutual di­
alogue open* Disagreements between the two states increased during 1976, 
but Romania-'did succeed in gaining a Committee of Foreign Ministers of the 
WTO meeting in November 1976* In a reciprocal gesture that year, Ceaucescu 
stated, in an article in the party paper Scinteia, that the Romanian mili­
tary remains true "to the original defensive purposes of the WTO and that 
it will remain faithful in abiding by Romanian obligations to 'defend so­
cialism and the interests of the Warsaw Pact against any aggression in
20
Europe**" Just what the "interests of the Warsaw Pact" are was left 
conveniently ambiguous*
The last major disagreements came in November 1978 during a meeting
of the WTO Political Consultative Committee in Moscow* At the meeting,
the Soviets called upon every state to increase the financial contrtbu-
tions to the WTO budget* Ceaucescu balked at the suggestion and walked
out of the meeting* He then pub11cally disagreed with the Soviets, say*
ing that the increase would be bad for Romania which is stressing "fac-
24torles over guns." A psuedo-crlsls situation developed, but the Romani* 
an people rallied r ound their government and Ceaucescu’s decision and the 
feelings soon abated* Both sides saw the folly in pursuing such a devi* 
sive argument.
As has been repeatedly stressed, the Romanians are cautiously inde* 
pendent and o not wish to irritate the Soviets unduly* It is always pos­
sible for the Soviets to take a micro-level challenge and see it as a macro- 
25level threat* The Soviets could easily have done so la November 1978,
but cooler heads prevailed* The Romanians have even offered concessions
to the Soviets, such as resumption of the expired Soviet-Romanian freind-
ship treaty (cancelled after the 1968 invasion) in exchange for a non-
;2bintervention guarantee. In 1971, the Romanians were intensely pursuing
27 'contacts with the Chinese, but backed off on these under Soviet concern*
They do not try to specifically challenge the Soviets Ideologically either* 
For instance, Romania "has not challenged the principle that there should
be close consultation between fraternal (socialist) parties and govern-
* „28 meats*
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The Romanians have pushed the Soviets for increased autonomy in
foreign policy and military decision-making. "But under no circumstances
has Romanian policy ever stated that it Intends to abandon the Warsaw
Pact and hence offered no pretext for a Soviet invasion similar to the
29ones used by the USSR In 1956 in H u n g a r y T o  date that policy has 
worked.
The leaders continually convey to the people that the potential for 
trouble with outside forces exists and in a way this keeps the people 
aware Of their being called upon to defend the country. The Romanian 
policy makes known that any invasion would be a difficult task and a long 
war would wreck Soviet (or any other staters) desires for a speedy engage­
ment and become a war of attrition greatly affect Ing the Invader’s morale. 
"Romania has built-up important and effective ’active1 military defenses 
that fitted in well with its extensive ’passive' defenses. Together they
-30-helped provide Romania with fairly wide limits for foreign policy action.” 
r r Yugoslaviav "The first objective of General People's Defense is 
not victory but deference* Colonel General Ljubicic claims that 'the 
readiness to resist determinedly is the most important obstacle to anyone’s 
plans of conquest.” 1 Similarly» as Ivan Volgyes has stated, "One state 
stands out as a country whose armed forces provide a well-delineated mis­
sion based on an unambiguous military doctrine —  Romania. In the case of 
the military, the mission of the armed forces is stated as being purely 
defensive and —  based on the principle of *defense of the fatherland by 
tne entire people' —  restricted to the defense of the Romanian fatherland;
50
32in a sense it is a national mission clearly aimed against the USSR•** 
They have proven to be effective policies in that they have kept the 
Soviets at a distance since the invasion of Czechoslovakia and have en­
abled these countries to pursue their active, autonomous foreign poli­
cies* Tliey communicate to any potential aggressor their readiness to 
fight and, as Christopher Jones at length states, these strategies "pro­
vide the military bases for the* political independence of these three 
«33 .-V.states
.VI. RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WClRLH
Having examined the dinlomatic and military development toward in* 
creasing independence of autonomy from the Soviet Union, we now turn to 
the specific relations of these states with the Third World. These in­
clude the growth of "national liberation movements," the burgeoning in­
fluence of organizations like the Nonaligned Movement and the Croup of 
77, as well as the use by these states of ilte United Nations as an in­
ternational forum for voicing their views. The greater Importance placed 
on relations with these nations #y the Superpowers, makes this area of 
study especially important. Any increase of influence \ > Albania, Ro­
mania or Yugoslavia in these states has the potential of decreasing the 
influence of the Soviet Union or at least causing these states to see 
other roads to economic, social, political and military development than 
the one provided by the Soviet Union.
In this section we shall view the attitudes of and actions taken by 
Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia towards the Third World, trade and the 
NIEO as well as the foie, if any, played by these states in the nonaligned 
movement. These actions, their effect on the Soviets1 role in the Third 
World and similar effects on Balkan autonomy (or the lack thereof) will 
also be shown.
We begin with the country having the lowest level of contacts with the 
Third World states. Because it has advocated a policy of virtual isola- 
%im $?m tfa. ***! «# tfel y»rl4, Al*«nia fa*. th« ftw»t ti«a »itfa &m»
states, “Albania has been least involved politically and economically 
in the Third World, It has not been in a position to provide economic 
or military assistance to any developing country or to any Third World 
national liberation movement. Similarly, Albania has neither made any 
investments , engaged in joint economic ventures with any develop* 
ing state/'*
Before the early 1970s, Albania placed little importance on the 
Third World, but the events of 1968 and the growth of relations between 
China and the U.S. changed its viewpoint. At this point, it began to 
reassess its relationship with China and to see the need for wider con­
tacts, “By July, 1980, the PSRA had established diplomatic ties with 
some 90 states, a majority of which were Third World nations,11 Albania 
has a different approach to diplomacy than other states in that “Tirane 
has essentially relied on a people-to-people diplomacy, preferring to 
exchange delegations with social, cultural, and political organisations 
from the Third World nations sympathetic to API/a domestic and foreign 
policy orientall0n8,, exchanging Congresses of trade Onions or Women's 
Unions, ■
This aspect of Albania's foreign policy towards the Third World is 
particularly threatening to the Soviet Union in one sense* Albania tries 
to portray itself and its system of almost total self-reliance as a “model** 
for developing states to follow. Over dependence on foreign aid and cred­
its leads to entanglement and
these represent 'nothing else but disguised forms 
of neocolonialism, * As one hi^i-level Albanian 
official fcM obs«v«J» ’the 
ifeat inint cessatfilsaref' , ■
and social Imperialists, are not a contribution 
to the development and progress of the backward 
countries. They are new shackles to enslave 
them, instruments to suck their blood, to plun­
der their wealth, to subjugate them and bring 
them to their knees, h
This hyperbole irritates the Soviets, who are blatantly pointed to by 
phrases like "social imperiallsts" and the calling attention to Himperi­
al 1st” actions of one socialist state by another socialist state only 
hurts Soviet credibility and distances the two states,
Albania also sees Itself as a model because It Is similar to many 
developing countr ies, shar ing under development, host H e  neighbors and 
past exploitation by outsiders* It supports revolutionary movements, at 
times without regard to their socio-political systems and rejects concepts 
like "nonalignment,11 "developing nations," "North/South" and "The Three 
Worlds*" It favors regimes Which try to overthrow the Imperialist con­
trols of the U.S. and USSR and has many contacts with Marxist-Lenin1st 
groups in Latin American states such as Brasil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexical 
and Venezuela, It supports the PLO's homeland concept and the Iranian 
revolution against the "imperialists," yet maintained some balance by 
having a diplomatic and trade delegation with Iraq in 1979,
Albanian trade with the Third World has not been significant, although 
It has become more important since the break with China, primarily because 
Albania and Romania have better opportunities and a wider range of trade 
with the West* While Albania preaches self-reliance and distrust of the 
West, in 1979 It maintained trade relations with forty-five states, "in­
cluding almost all the European countries,”5 
\  ft* Ai|^ia % a *  remained a relatively unimport§<& aourea •
lack of resources, an unstable Industrial base and its sense of isolation. 
However, its desire to combat Soviet "imperialism" and its criticism of 
this imperialism serve to strain the limited Sovlet-Albanian relationship 
and distance the two states in yet one more area*
If Albanian rhetoric causes increased separation between the Soviets 
and Albanians, Romanian and Yugoslav actions in the Third World can be 
seen as a major obstacle to an area in which the Soviets have made great 
strides in the past few decades* Both Romania and Yugoslavia have been 
extremely active in the Third World; Yugoslavia sir c early 1960s 
and Romania especially after the events of 1968* As me>*Uoned earlier, 
Romanian refusal to sever relations with Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War was contrary to Soviet wishes on the topic and caused the Soviets much 
concern* Other actions by the three states have caused further erosion of 
relations at various times and as we shall see have damaged the Soviets1 
Influence in certain Third World countries.
Following 1968, "Ceaucescu began to make a special push In the Third 
World, trying to patch up relations with the Arabs (while not abandoning 
support for Israel), and establish them with the Africans and Latin Amerl- 
cansr#l This was inaccordance with its desire to diversify its contacts
and relations with the world so as to maintain friends and allies on all 
sides*
In 1972, Romania declared itself "to be a ‘Socialist developing* coun­
try, thus creating a basis for its claim to be a bridge between the East
g
and the South*" The call for development of closer ties with the South 
was fully incorporated into the ideological and foreign policy line during
the 1972 Romanian National Conference which occurred shortly after
Ceauceseu’s “first extended visit to the developing world: Central Africa,
9
Congo, Zaire, Tanzania, Zambia, Sudan, and Egypt.“ He ostensibly sought 
to generate trade with these states, exchanging Romanian Industrial goods 
for their raw materials, yet he returned with the idea that Romania was 
actually a “developing” nation and as such had a special relationship with 
the Third World —  one not shared by the Soviet Union, By saying this, 
Romania is excluding the Soviets from this elite, worldwide ’’club”, en­
hancing its position with these states, and strengthening its autonomy of
the Soviets.
Yet, while doing this, Romania “has always stressed that whatever ideo­
logical Innovations it may introduce are applicble to it alone and do not 
have any relevance for other Communist parties. . , while stressing its 
right to define its own ideology ,the RCP has also taken care to reassure
Hoscow that it does not intend t o ’export1 its ideological innovations to 
other parties,”*^ Romania has restrained itself in this area of ideologi­
cal Importation and has limited itself by not claiming to be a “model” 
such as the one exported by Albania. Perhaps by not challenging the 
Soviets in the realm of ideology, Romania has had greater leeway in its 
actions.
Similarly, “In the course of developing the policy of partial align­
ment, the Romanian elite have increasingly sought to project Romania, , , 
as a small, developing, European (state),” and not as the leader of the 
small and medium nations.** Romania has stressed the need for these states
to claim their roles in the international arena from the superpowers and 
not let themselves be dictated to* At times, Romania will take the role 
of small power spokesman, as It did during the Helsinki talks, but this 
is in keeping with its traditional style of quiet diplomacy which has 
probably worked better in increasing autonomy from the Soviets than an 
aggressive, overly assertive policy would have done* Romania is deter­
mined to increase the power and role of small and middle**ised states 
within the bipolar world and under Ceaucescu Romania has been successful
12In quietly asserting itself within the Eastern European and world arena.
Romania has the closest ties of any East European state with the de­
veloping countries of Latin America, because it established relations ear­
ly and claims to be culturally related to these states because of its Ro- 
mance language and shared Latin background. Here, especially, Romania's 
image as non-ideological and pragmatic is evident, as is "Bucharest's con­
sistent unwillingness to establish or break relations with a developing 
country as a result of radical regime changes in that country (are evi­
denced by this example). . .After Allende's overthrow. . .Romania not only 
maintained her embassy In Santiago (Chile) but used it as a means of ob­
taining the release of prominent leftists from the millta:y junta's jails." 
Romania and China were the only communist states to keep embassies in 
Chile after the 1973 overthrow. The Romanians again pursued a different 
policy than did the Soviets and it worked to their benefit. Latin American 
states "had the most important role in Bucharest's Nonaligned Movement"*^ 
and the entire concept of Romania as a "developing" state has gained much
credence due to the proven friendship of Romania —  a type of friendship 
which is lacking between some of these states and the USSR, do doubt 
much to the Soviet’s dissatisfaction.
Romanian friendship has been translated into acceptance of it by the 
Third World into such organizations as the Group of 77 and observer with 
the nonaligned. The Soviet Union, however, is the leader of a block and 
a superpower and is excluded from these groups because of its structure, 
level of development and dubious motives. It cannot claim to be similar 
to the developing states as can Romania. This exclusion is undoubtedly 
irritating to the Soviets and serves to compound the divergent position 
taken by Romania and the USSR.
On the economic front, Romania has been heavily involved in trade
and aid to the developing countries* "In terms of capital investment,
Romania is the most heavily Involved of all Bast European countries, with
the largest amounts Invested in such countries as Nigeria ( 2 million
in timber operations), Liberia, and Zambia.11 Aid which Romania gives,
besides small amounts of arms to liberation movements is primarily in the
form of personnel training and technical experts. By September 1979,
’’over 15,000 Romanian technicians were working in the developing countries,
with the largest number in Libya, while the same number of experts and
more than 12,000 students from those countries were being trained in Ro­
llmania." Romania has economic relations with over 100 developing nations 
compared to 30 over twenty years ago. "Over the period 1960-1975, trade 
relations with these countries went up about 24 times . . » the share of 
these countries in our country’s foreign trade rose from 5% in 1960 to
Xu a move contrary to Soviet wishes, "Romania supports more strongly 
than any of its allies the movement for a New International Economic —  
and the Romanians add, Political —  Order, i.e., one in which the needs 
of the less developed and small and medium-sized states could be more ade­
quately served. This ’democrltization* of international relations can only
19' '■take place, of course, at the expense of the superpowers," The Romanians 
call for a NIEO because of the basic inequalities inherent in the tradition­
al trading relationships and the "neocolonialist" aspects of the present
system.
"Although they seldom name any 'neocolonialistv state. • • Romania is 
also the only'CKBA member to have openly supported the recent demands ex­
pressed by the UNCTAD and the Group of 77 that developed Communist coun-
20tries provide their fair shaire of aid to the South." Because Romania 
claims to be a "developing" state, it can call upon its fellow bloc mem­
bers, primarily the Soviet Union, to share their wealth with the less de­
veloped states and develop a new world economic order. Romania can also 
point to its great dependence on the West for aid and capital in order to 
avoid haying to shoulder the burden. The Soviets are placed in a delicate 
position in this area for* they cannot ignore the calls for aid without 
jeopardizing their stand as a supporter of the Third World’s calls for 
equality and yet are unable to overtly curb the Romanians without earning 
the wrath of the developing states. The Soviets will probably try to 
quietly rectify this situation given appropriate opportunities.
Conversely, some believe that Romania has acted, inadvertently, as a
channel of communication between anti-communist states such as Zaire, 
Gabon, and Sudan and the USSR. Romania's neutral stand has attracted 
states such as Guinea, Senegal and Ivory Coast, while its good relations
with China have also been a boon to increasing contacts with various
21Third World states.
Romania deplores armed conflict between developing states such as 
Angola against Zaire, Ethiopia versus Somalia and now Iran vs. Iraq.
It refuses to take sides in these bloody, intra-movement struggles and 
Instead attempts, when possible, to moderate and contain the situation, 
the fact that the Soviets are openly supporting une side or the other 
does not help the Romanians In granting them greater room for movement, 
yet they persevere.
The Romanian feelings are intensified in situations involving two 
socialist developing states. It condemned the invasion of Cambodia by 
Vietnam with vehemence similar to that which it opposed the Caechoslovak 
invasion in 1968. "No kind of motive or argument can justify intervention 
and interference into the affairs of another state —  under whatever form
this should appear —  especially when the two countries in question are
22Socialist." "Romania refused point blank to participate" in a Soviet
. ■ ■23 ■
economic reconstruction of Vietnam, yet it showed greater restraint 
after the Chinese Invasion of Vietnam the following month* Romania at 
this point valued the relations developed with the Chinese enough to 
restrain its criticism of Chins —  and felt secure enough to blast the 
Soviet-backed action.
Braun posits that, to compensate for loss of influence in the West, 
Romania has turned to the Third World. By 19?#, t a m m  had viwitei
more than 30 nonaligned states* Through continued courting* Romania was 
admitted to the Group of 77 In February 1976* Yet collaboration with 
these states in no way contradicted Romania’s membership in the WTO as 
Romania is socialist, but "also a state in the course of development*" 
Acting in a classic manner of a state in danger* it has increased the 
number of allies to ensure that any attempts at intervention by another 
will result in widespread shock waves* Plus* the Third World majority 
in the UN General Assembly is "most vociferous in seeking the protection 
of national rights and sovereignty." At the same time it has diversi­
fied its economic ties so as not to become reliant on any one major source*
As for the UN* both Romania and Yugoslavia have used it as a forum
in which to promote the cause of the small and developing states* In
1967* Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu of Yugoslavia became the first
East European chairman of the UN General Assembly* and Yugoslavia has been
active in promoting the rights of small states and the obligations due
them by the large ones in the United Nations. It "has preferred to stress
the universal rights and obligations of the UN Charters and their validity
lt25
for relations between socialist states as well as between all others*
Romania has "participated in the UN Conference on Trade and Develop­
ment* ’by siding with other developing countries,1 The Romanians have also
been also at the forefront of the movement at the UN to restructure the or­
ganisation in a manner which would give the smaller states more power vis-a-
■26""vis the great powers*" For instance* Romania haa suggested that the sise 
of the Security Council be Increased on a geographical basis because of the 
greater role played by a medium and smaller states* with full veto power
for all or, conversely, inereasing the powera of the General Assembly 
vls-a^vls the Security Council, These suggestions are naturally op­
posed by both the Soviet Union and the United States because of their 
desire to maintain as much power in this world forum as possible,
Yugoslavia has especially turned to and used it as a tool in its 
foreign policy because though it is bureaucratic, it has already estab­
lished the apparatus for extensive economic reforms and development pro** 
grams of which Yugoslavia can take advantage. Although the UN offers
the "best framework for promoting economic cooperation,11 the coopera-
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tIon of the developing nations has been lacking. This problem hao been 
increasingly prevalent in the nonaligned movement recently.
The First Conference of the Nonaligned States was held in Belgrade 
in 1961 and was the culmination of Yugoslav initiatives In Asia and Africa 
in the late 195os, It demonstrated the leading role played by Yugoslavia 
in the movement from its inception into the late 1970s, The concept of 
nonalignment provides nations which are not formally tied to either super** 
power an instrument to promote greater equality for all states. Over time 
the movement has embraced the NIE0, promoted the development of the less 
developed states and used the United Nations and its organs to further 
their cause, Tito was an originator of the movement (as was Nasser of 
Egypt, Nehru of India, Sukarno of Indonesia and Nkrumah of Ghana), and 
nonalignment has been the keystone to Yugoslav policy towards the rest of 
the world; in fact, It is nearly impossible to Uscuss its relations 
with developing states without mentioning nonalignment, for they are vari-
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Thi movement appeared to falter slightly and Tito had a difficult lint 
gaining support for the third conference In huaakn in 19/0. However, Tito 
later declared that "the |>c» 1 i«*v of mmal lgnnent had proved its worth, no­
body except enemies ot peace dared to challenge its correetticwH, and the 
necessary task for the future was agreement on a program of common net Ion, **12 
Wit lie Albania rejects the entire concept of "nonalignment,** 
has attempted to get closer to the movement. "In seeking to d$v#i#p clog^r 
links with the developing countries and the nonaligned m(>vement, 
also seeking to distance itself further from the Soviet connunii^*^^:
It has tried since 1974 to become a member of the movement and did obtain 
observer status and attended the 1976 Colombo and 1979 Havana conferences, 
Romania’s interest in the nonaligned developing states, "consist of the 
principles of respect for national independence and sovereignty* fnll 
equality of rights, non-*intervention in domestic affairs* mutual advantage* 
non-resort to the use and threat of force* the right of every people to
decide its socio-economic development according to its own will, without
34outside interference*"
But it has been Yugoslavia which has been most involved in the non- 
aligned movement. It "acknowledges that nonalignment Is the only ioreipr 
policy that allows them to play an important international role*11 Karen
Daw is ha also posits that Yugoslavia's role as a leader of the n o n a l i p ^
i t
may have helped stave off Soviet invasion at varying times because of the
extremely negative repercussions tha would have issued from the other 
aligned states.^
"Of the five original major nonaligned countries, , . all but 
rejected quite sharply the Soviet Union's arrogance and meddling In
-siiliHIR 
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internal affairs, despite an enormous amount of Soviet aid granted to these
nations, And, in the case of. the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, four
37of them voted In the United Nations to condemn it, while India abstained*11 
It appears then that Yugoslavia has had success in pursuing this nonaligned
policy and distancing itself from the Soviet Union. It has condemned m%m 
right the Soviet actions in various parts of the world, notably
... ■ -v
and Afghanistan, has succeeded in getting other nonaligned states 
similar stands in most cases and continues to advocate a policy
the elimination of blocs and alignment with great powers.'-- a hey ingredi­
ent in Moscow’s foreign policy* So in one s e n s e ,  the Yugoslav’s indepen­
dence has been assured.
However, there is .mother development to be considered and that is
the growth of problems within the movement* the conference i* Lusaka mad*
little world impact compared to the earlier conferences and the loss of
many of the strong leaders and new messages of the movement resulted in
decreasing the effectiveness of the movement* This also appeared in the
semi-hypocrisy of some of the people who claimed to be "nonaligmed*”
Nasser’s hands were tied during the Arab-Israeli war and bath he and Indira
Gandhi felt unable to condemn the Soviet invasion of Chechoslovakia because
38of their dependence on Soviet support* Granted, Naaser later expelled 
the Soviets from Egypt, but in 1968 he was not totally "nonaligned.”
this problem of partial adherence or semi-alignment to other powers, 
primarily the Soviet Union and China, has hurt the original intentions of
.v;. "■ y^\: \v ■ ■ V;.;:; ■ ■ :'J;: :vv - % ■ . -"S^
the movement* Throughout the 1970s it had dual objectives and preached
non-interference yet practiced cooperation with the blocs. Many nations
are ’’beholden to one or the other Great Power and are reluctant to organise
39
qua nonallgned for fear o of finding it*” At the conference in Havana 
in 1979, Fidel Castro gained control of the movement (this being compounded 
by the death of Tito the following year) and he is known to be quite ”tol- 
erant” of Soviet expansion and hostile to the West* He did fail, however, 
in getting the group to acknowledge the Soviet Union as its ’’natural ally*? 
Especially following Afghanistan, "the intervention has certainly put m, . ^  
end to any chance that #he n^alljned movement will in the foreseeable
65
s?;
future acknowledge the Soviet Union ad its 'natural.
There are perhaps nine"nonaligned' states which could be seen as
clients of the Soviet Union if one looks at their votes cast in the UN
on the resolution condemning the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan Cuba,
Ethiopia, Grenada»Laos, Mozambique, South Yemen and Vietnam supported
the invasion and 24 abstained or did not vote. These "nonaligned" states,
including the invaded state itself, implicitly or tacitly condoned the in-
; 41vasion of a nonaligned state by a Great Power. Burma resigned from the 
movement because it felt it had abandoned neutrality, Clearly, the Soviet's 
qualms about the movement are decreasing because of this shift in the em-
3
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phasis in nonalignment. They no doubt encourage "Castro's campaign to
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bring the Nonaligned Movement closer to Soviet interests."
The movement has also suffered because of personality clashes among 
many leaders and the pursuit of self or selfish Interests by states, much 
to the dismay of the Yugoslavs, Regionalism, not Internationalism has be* 
come the trend and the movement lacks political strength although construe* : 
tive cooperation does exist In economic areas, The larger, diverse member* / 
ship and lack of bipolar relatio n) makes unclear the formal and informal 
nonaligned distinctions and Increases the "feeling of helplessness" against
liltS
the Great Powers. All of these hamper the effective development and unity 
43of the movement ~ and reduces Soviet concerns about is direction. This 
is not to say that Yugoslavia has not benefited from involvement in the 
movement, quite the contrary. Instead it will force them to either try 
and change its direction or unilaterally turn to other means of mainta 
Independence vis-a-vis the Soviets.
MfflMaiHI
Actually, Yugoslavia has attempted to reverse the trend of the non- 
aligned* It Is reluctant to abandon the movement because the policy is 
one upon which the entire nation has agreed and has called upon the Bom­
bers to rethink their policy and make it more dynamic because their needs 
have changed sioev the policy was first developed* The original issues 
such as decolonization remain valid, and the movement will be more "left" 
oriented, yet while it continues to be anti-Western, it is not likely to 
become pro-Soviet* As the Soviets get Into the Third World, they will 
"run the risk (as the example of Afghanistan dramatically demonstrated)
of producing among the nonaligned a new set of grievances which are anti-
44Soviet rather than anti-Western in character."
One expression of this idea is Yugoslavia's support of the N1E0, It 
believes the current economic system is unable to change and adapt to new 
problems and ideas and the developed states are unwilling to equalize dis­
tribution* It holds that "elimination of structural discrepancies, the 
expansion of productive forces, new, more even distribution of world in­
come, can be achieved only through the establishment of the (NIEO), The
HIED has become an imperative of the present times and it is in the vital
45interests of both the developing and the developed countries*"
Through involvement with the nonaligned movement, Tito and other 
representatives have had great diplomatic contact with the Third World,
In addition, Yugoslav trade with these states grew from $279 million in 
exports and $562 million in Imports in 1973 to $1 billion in exports and 
$1*3 billion in imports in 1978, a growth rate in trade of about 300%*
Its "deficit in the balance of trade with developing countries has had a
tendency to decrease,"^ Yugoslav trade* both exports and imports, is 
heaviest with the Arab nations, involving $571 million in exports and 
$670 million in Imports (1978 figures), followed by the Asian countries. 
Trade with the African and Latin American developing states is quite 
small in comparison. It depends heavily on Arab oil, hence the heaviest 
trade with this region. In If78, 47.2% of the total imports from devel­
oping countries was the result of importing crude oil, primarily from
47socialist Iraq, the major supplier for Yugoslavia.
"Closer cooperation, joint ventures, and construction activities 
are some of the new means of cooperation between Yugoslavia and develop-
AGt ■
ing nations." Yugoslavia is more obviously a role model for the Third 
World states and it purposely exports f:H* concept. An example of its 
so doing is the "efforts to merge th*? best : v m the Eastern planned econo­
mies and the Western free enterprise syri'cm? The result is the hybrid
.40
known as 'market socialism.*" This mixture is beneficial for Yugoslavia 
domestically and a rational one for developing states which are not yet 
able to fully pursue either road.
Yugoslavia, unlike isolationist Albania or WTO and CMEA member Roman­
ia, is a plausible model for the developing countries. It offers the most 
variants of any Marxist-Leninlst system, as Radu has stated,
Because over a period of almost four decades Yugoslavia 
encountered an in part successfully coped with the prob­
lems of the rich vs. poor (developed parts of Yugoslavia 
vs. developing parts), nationalist rivalries, cultural 
and religious conflicts, and even the problem of a one- 
party dictatorship or 'closed society' vs. a one-and-a 
half party system, or 'half-open society.' 50
The Soviets, however, cannot offer this model to the developing states and
Yugoslav policy is able to approach a wider number of states without the 
ideological baggage and political-economic ties implicit in Soviet poli­
cy.
Romania and Yugoslavia have exercised self-restraint in their actions 
toward the Third World and the developing states* Romania has stressed 
that there is no contradiction in being "developing" and "socialist" at 
th^ same time* "while also declaring that her position in the world is 
such that fwe have been and are paying special attention to the develop­
ment of relations with the countries which have taken the road to the af­
firmation of independence,* that is, with the South as a w h o l e , I t  has 
become more careful in supporting the nonaligned movement issues which are 
sensitive to the Soviets, though the RCR views Romania as "objectively" 
participating in the movement. Its trade with the developing countries 
reached about 10% of its total by 1980, the largest share of any East 
European country, These trends are likely being clasely watched by Moscow,
Yugoslav policy is more defiant, however, for "the views and Interests
of Yugoslavia as a nonaligned country, and the views and interests of the
great powers are objectively divergent in many points and under certain
circumstances may well result in major or minor misunderstandings and
clashes," yet "power politics and insistence that might is right cannot
be the foundation of relations with whatever country and ultimately only
32damage one's own interests," Because it is not a member of the Soviet 
bloc, Yugoslavia can orient its policy further from the Soviets while still 
remaining socialist.
In all, the policies of the states toward the Third World and the de­
veloping countries varies widely in their divergence from the Soviets, Each
state is constrained to a different extent, yet?
Romania’s relations with the Third World countries indicate 
that Bucharest has always been aware of its own limits and 
has carefully avoided a head-on collision with the Soviet 
bloc (while having the most ,tautonomousH policy). Hoxha1 s 
Albania,in sharp defiance of the Soviet Union and its 
East European alliesf has acted in accordance with its 
own interests to establish ties with the Third World. Of 
course, Yugoslavia, as cofounder of the Monaligned Move­
ment, has conducted Third World foreign policy that is de­
cidedly independent of East European policies and actions. 53
VII* RECENT TRENDS
Up to this point, on the whole, we have focused on events which took 
place prior to 1980, with only occasional references to recent actions* 
During the period between the Czechoslovak invasion and the occupation of
Afghanistan, Albanian, Romanian and Yugoslav policies and activities have 
been made largely independent of Soviet desires and at times in open de­
fiance of Soviet demands*
In the past few years, however, less of this has been evident because 
of a lack of opportunities to be Independent of the Soviets, a change in 
the internal and international scenes (as perceived by these countries) 
and an increasing dependence on the Soviets for certain items*
The major change in Albania came in 1978 when Hcxha expelled Chinese 
advisors and severed relations with Beijing* This resulted primarily to 
China's increasing rapprochement with the Western world* especial!. the 
United States, starting in about 1971. After Kao's death, the "pragmatic 
regime of Dung and Hua rapidly soured the ties between Peking and Tirana" 
as Chinese-Western trade and diplomatic relation* flourished,* Before the 
break, Albania received almost two times- as much aid from China between 
1959 and 1975 than from all other sour es of foreign aid from 1945 to 1975 
Six out of seven major investment p r o c t s  completed by 1978 were also 
financed by the Chinese stresslag.-the ;reat importance- of Chinese aid to 
Albania.^
Because of t M s  loss of ai^, the Albanians have been forced to turn
to other sources. It has trade relations with such states as Italy,
West Germany, Sweden and Japan, as well as a small but growing amount 
with the East European states, primarily Romania* tmt great hostility 
still remains toward the Soviet Union. On the occasion of Alfc/?hid*s 
national day in November 1982, the Soviets extended the wafmesi congratu­
lations in recent years, some say as an overture to the K t b fii|^ 
they were coldly rejected.
Albania has diplomatic ties with Italy, Turkey, Francej Kenya and
some neutrals, and Canada has pursued the possibility of establishing
ties as well. There has been greater desire to have better relations
with Greece as the two states are technically still in a state of war*
And in a strange recent development, Marvlne Howe hints that Albania
may be quietly moving to increase ties with China and points to a trade
4
and payments protocol signed October 10, 1983 between the two states*
Yet Albania remains hostile to the Soviets with no Indications of any
changes. ......
Romania has maintained an active foreign policy as key to its con­
tinued autonomy from the Soviets* In Hay of 1978, Ceaucescu visited 
the PRC and Chairman Hua Guofeng returned the visit in August when he 
also stopped in Iran and Yugoslavia. Hua's trips "were blasted by the
Soviet Union and Romania subsequently felt constrained to respond in
5
calrification and defense of their party and state prerogatives*M 
Romania did not back down at the Soviet charges, yet felt it had to defend 
its policy and actions*
similarly, the Romanian response to the occupation of Afghanistan 
wat, r* t; lined and not as vehement as it had been with Chechoslovakia or
Vietnam, It repeated the standard line of respect for national sover­
eignty and in the United Hattons, Romania "did not participate in the 
vote. They did, however, state the need for 'respect by all states for 
the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan and for the Afghan peo­
ple's right to choose their development path themselves, without any 
outside interference.*" This Is perhaps correctly interpreted as
"Romania's Inability to withstand strong pressures from Moscow in cases
" ;6where Soviet interests are threatened." In 1980, the Romanian prime 
minister met with the Afghan deputy prime minister, demonstrating "Roman­
ia's coming back into line on Afghanistan* (It) was subsequently demon­
strated by the Romanian media's increasingly frequent repetition of the 
Soviet position and Bucharest's support for it . . • (But) Romania still 
does not wholeheartedly accept the Soviet version of the initial cause 
for intervention."^
Romania was more consistent regarding acceptance of the Kampuchean
representative to the United Nations in November 1979 when it "cast the
first anti-Soviet vote of any Warsaw Pact member, supporting the repre-
8sentative of the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate Cambodian delegate," 
Romania has never accepted the "Vietnamese-imposed" regime on Cambodia 
and follows its own and China's wishes on this matter. And "it also 
avoided supporting the Vietnamese or condemning the Chinese attack on 
Vietnam in 1979, while deploring the conflict between fraternal Communist 
countries," Here the Romanians read the situation as being "more vital 
for Beijing than Moscow's interest in legitimizing Heng Samrin's regime. 
In the Afghan issue, however, the roles were reversed, , • These two cir­
cumstances clearly define the two most important sets of restraints under
^ ^
ffajyfc s foreign policy has to operate,”~v' These entangling re*
would bo a classic case to exhibit the rationale for non­
in any case, the foreign policy autonomy of Romania has be- 
compromised in recent years, 
fff Romania’s greatest domestic concerns, however, has been and 
tfliii probacy continue to be its high level of foreign trade and credit 
Wa&R states that, ’’This ’developing country’ concept is simply
^ cljryr4rtn of Uranian awareness that economic as well as diplomatic
ri
moving against them. Because of a lag in the world 
and the decrease In its oil production, Romania 
IwS W  t w m  to the Meet, primarily through the Internariomml Monetary 
‘fMiiC ■ ##•***• bi order to pay off other debts. By the end of
banks about $11.4 b i l l i o n , £ b m  debt has 
^II^IMnM^ednled at least twice since January of lfS2 and 
the (tost Favored Nation trading status because 
emigration policies, Milovan Djilias said, regard- 
amd Yugoslav Indebtedness to the West, ’’What hurts most
„10
is  the
he a. A' i' i'< •
drying up of credits from the West, and the even more omi-
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rise in trade with the Soviet Union.” Yugoslavia is becoming more
on the Soviets because the U,S, and West are not extending
as easily, while Romania ’’has been forced to turn to the Soviet
14Its (oil) supply” and Ceaucescu says that "Romania's
15
Union , • , is increasing this year by 15 percent.” 
has been Romania's principal trading partner, ”ln 
one fifth of its foreign trade • • •  Operative at
M  % ■< * i ' 3: 4 1- -
present Is a trade agreement.'for 1981-85. In the current five-year peri­
od Soviet-Romantan trade turnover is to exceed 17 hillion rubles, almost 
double the level off the previous five-year period.” This recent in­
crease in trade is of concern to the Romanians as it increases Romanian 
economic dependence on the Soviets and Is no doubt due to the increasing 
Romanian debt and lack of cheap Western aid. Both Romania and Yugoslavia 
are turning to the Soviet Union because they are able to negotiate barter
deals which the West normally does not do. This, however, restrains their 
autonomy in other areas so that this source of aid is not eliminated.
As for the events in Poland, Ceaucescu ”has aot joined the rest of 
the Warsaw Pact in praising the Polish leaders for their actions, but he 
has also bean careful not to criticise the martial-law government.” 
Ceaucescu ashed for a meeting with Secretary of State Haig to urge U.S. 
restraintaad a return to the arm talks because he believed U.S. pursuit 
of the issue exacerbates the problem and reduces the ability for his in­
dependent pdlle^ implementation because of increased European tensions.1  ^
Romania was again acting as a moderator, but this time because it was con­
cerned about the downturn in detente which, in the Romanian view, is es­
sential in providing the Romanians with the possibility of foreign policy 
manuever aod autonomy.
As indicated above, Yugoslavia has also been hit by foreign trade 
prAlesis.a^ debt. "In 1978, the overall Yugoslav debt exceeded $11.3
18bliliim* Hoit of these credits were extended by the West (67 percent).”
vulnerable to oil price Increases and the downturn in the 
* tcause of its heavy dependence upon world trade. "It is
of limited value for Yugoslavia to re-orient its foreign trade towards 
its Comecon neighbours and the Soviet Union, Apart from the political 
overtones involved in such a switch, these countries are unable to sup­
ply many of the goods which Yugoslavia needs, . • Thus in 1982, there 
mm» a balance on trade with the USSR of $670 million in Yugoslavia's 
fssof, but a deficit of $2,100 million with the EEC countries and of 
$^08 million with the United States."^
doth the USSR and China offered assistance to Yugoslavia, Tikhonov
guaranteed a 20% increase in oil shipments which ^can be paid in Yugoslav
20exports under a barter arrangement," and China also offered a $120 mil­
lion loam and reached agreements on trade of ships and machinery. While 
Ympmiavia may be able to maintain its political Independence from the 
Soviets* It appears to be being drawn more closely into the Soviet web 
10 entanglement,
l^l^lavia had minor squabbles over such international affairs as 
Sovfel ;lii#nsored aggression between Kampuchea and Vietnam in 1978, but It 
was the ilf$ Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which produced the harshest 
reactions from the Yugoslavs* They condemned the Soviets and sponsored 
resolutions in the UK condemning them on the basis of the sovereign right
of nations to independence and non-interference in internal affairs. Cer­
tain notes of distress were detected in the reaction* with one analyst
p$a||f»£ .that• "the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has magnified the ioug-
threat of Soviet Intervention in Yugoslavia and has thereby rein­
unity of the Yugoslav leadership. The effects of such external
to unity, however, may be short-lived* „21 This is a reasonable
llliilllll# iSIflititeSiiiiiis 111 iiiSilifaiii S&fi ■ i . j . , - t £ ? 2
assertion when one views the reaction and rapid mending of differences 
after the Czechoslovak invasion* Indeed* Leonid Brezhnev less than a 
year later stated that, "We would not be Communists, we would not be 
internationalists* , . if we failed to rise above the past and see the 
vast perspectives of the pre. -mt times and realize the identify of our
vital interests,"22
The biggest blow to Yugoslavia, however, has been the death of Tito 
in 1980, For nearly four decades he had been the unifier of the nation 
and its foundation of and inspiration for the "separate road" towards 
socialist development which it had taken. The domestic political cli- 
mate| in terms of rotation of power has been very smooth, but no clear 
leader has emerged from the Federal Executive Council with power enough 
to lead the country. In a 1972 article in Orbist it was stated that, 
Soviets are undoubtedly looking forward to the post-Tito era and
4 Yugoslavia devoid of Titofs unifying personality will re* 
vert to tbs political instability of the lnterwar years and thus become 
. IMftafeio to Soviet pressures and influences,"2'*
This has not occurred within the national leadership, but there 
have been some worrisome signals.
The recent growth in nationality differences within the Yugoslav 
federation has become more overt and violent. In the past, Tito's 
pff$et|ce was able to calm the troubles, yet the disturbances have now 
$liNK$£if increased. The Kosovo province has been especially troublesome 
iidtbe Albanian majority there has been rioting at the behest, so the 
dlaimt of the Albanian state, Yugoslavia has accused Albania
dissidents in Southern Yugoslavia* This ethnic instability decreases 
the cooperation which was evident earlier between these states*
Yugoslavia remains active in the Third World and the nonaiigned 
movement , but the loss of Tito and of his leadership of the movement does 
not enhance the Yugoslav world role. It is unable to provide financial 
support for developing states, yet it does offer workers and technical 
support*
All the states in recent years have begun to adjust and adapt to 
the new geopolitical situation* The Increase in East-West tensions, 
primarily between the U*S* and USSR, has not aided the independent or 
autonomous policies pursued by the states, and the lack of credits and 
growth of indebtedness has also hurt their range of activities and re­
duced the leeway they previously enjoyed. This is not to say that they 
have failed in their autonomous policies; rather they are forced to be 
-*m their actions., must pay greater attention to Soviet- sensi-V ’ :v'V-~ ■
be more creative* They have opposed the Soviets in the 
midie and vorld forums and continued to display new Initiatives* Both 
the Romanians and Yugoslavs have proposed, with Papandreoe of Greece and 
the leaders of Turkey and Bulgaria, a nuclear free Balkans and greater 
coordination of Balkan development. The West calls the nuclear free 
plan a one-sided proposition as only Turkey and Greece have nuclear weap­
ons under the control of the U,S., however, the calls for Balkan coopera-
24
;y r.'tjlip' aft reminiscent of the old moves for Balkan independence, and progress
it closely watched by the Soviets,
VII I . CONCLUSION
Tito died in 1980, Brezhnev in November of 1982, Andropov in early 
1984. Enver Hoxha is in his late seventies and reportedly in ill health, 
while Ceaucescu is also approaching his twilight years. In many ways the 
policies pursued by each of the countries discussed here have been the re­
sults of efforts by these men. While realizing the foolhardiness of play­
ing soothsayer and predicting the future, undoubtedly the loss of these 
individuals will play a major role in the continuation of old policies 
or pursuit of new, innovative roads,
the foreign policy of Romania has been closely related to Ceaucescu*s 
personal rule and "there are voices in Bucharest that do not support such 
etpai ties with the South (for example), at least for economic reasons,
concentration of political power in Ceaucescu*s hands may
has been purging those party members, such as Mehmet Shehu who supposedly 
committed suicide, who desire an end to total isolation and who call for
Since the deaths of Brezhnev and Andropov, and the uncertainty at the
of Konstantin Chernenko's ability to hold power, Moscow's foreign
\;t|je^last section, mention was made of the Kosovo incidents and increasing
his foreign policy will ultimately depend on his personal poll
longevity,"* It has been reported in the New York Times that Hoxha
increased ties with Yugoslavia, then presumably Moscow and the West, 2
appears to have been put on hold with only the continuation of past
and exchange of rhetoric with Washington being assured. Also, in
nationality problems within Yugoslavia. 411 of these Incidents, compounded 
by the stagnation of the world economy and heavy debt of some of the states 
do not lend themselves to a stablizing situation. Stability, however, is 
not a natural state for the Balkans.
Much is made of the Soviet desires to re-establish a atronger presence 
in those states and, no doubts that is a valid concern. Djllas has said 
that "if our (economic and social) crisis continues indefinitely, probably 
the USSR will intervene through Bulgaria. . , The Soviet Union . • . is
tending to become increasingly active here in Yugoslavia, just because we
are in difficulties. Yugoslav trade is turning more to the Bast. The
Russians are sending more artistic groups here, to Serbia as distinct from
the ether republics, to underlie 'lt'beit::'histd'rlc sympathy with the Serbs
3
and accent the isolation of Serbia in Yugoslavia.” It may serve Moscow's
r •
interests to alternately subvert the nationalities and then make concili- 
gestures and visits. But the Soviets would probably prefer a weak 
Yugoslavia to a deeply divided one which could plunch the area
and civil war.
Iftke Soviets feel that their vital, national Interests were being 
threatened —  if perhaps Romania wanted to have a more capitalistic system 
or Yugoslavia desired to join NATO —  they would intervene, but any inter­
vention would earn the wrath of the majority of the nonaligned and develop­
ing states and would bring strong Western economic and perhaps military 
ise in certain cases. There are reasons, however, to believe that 
s would not take such a drastic turn.
; None of the countries is liable to make any sweeping internal changes
or external orientations* Furthermore, important ns these states are to 
the Soviets, they are not seen as being as important as an East Germany 
or a Poland* Both Aurel Braun and John Brown have discussed this Northern/ 
Southern Tier division in the Soviet perceptions of Eastern Europe* "Rela­
tive Soviet restraint. , . is to be explained only by a mix of factors! 
its (Romania’s) secondary geographic position in Southern Europe, its per­
petuation of Communist Party rule at home" as well as the lack of heavy 
Industrial development and the non-Stalinist challenge to the Soviet system 
These major differences in Romania, as well as in Albania or Yugoslavia, 
over those in Czechoslovakia or Hungary are major reasons why these states 
have not been invaded in 1968 or anytime before or since. The Soviets are 
store likely to in^de when the internal system Is threatened than when the 
foreign policy initiatives of a state differ from those of the Soviets.
This distinction has become finer over time, yet 1 believe it still holds.
fast performance would seem to indicate that all three states will 
continue to pursue policies Independently of the Soviets, yet with inereas- 
ing sensitivity to Soviet desires and its position on certain Issues* 
Romania and Yugoslavia will still be active in foreign policy initiatives 
and Albania may reach out more to the outside world over time. They all 
could adhere to the Romanian policy statement that, "While permanently de­
veloping friendship and cooperation with all socialist countries, Romania 
does not conceive of extending its ties with one socialist country to the 
detriment of its relationship with others, and does not counterpose its 
£«l«ndahlp with one country against Its cooperation with other countries."5 
iff*»umably this Includes non-socialist as well as socialist states*
The independence and/or Autonomy of military policy vis-a-vis the
Soviets will probably remain outside the Soviet sphere of influence, 
Albanian and Yugoslav policy is independent by nature of their politi­
cal situations, while Romania should continue to pursue its diluted ties 
with the WTO as it considers its policy vital to the defense of the nation, 
To what degree this, too, is n result of Ceaucescu’s personal power remains 
to be seen.
The ties already established with developing and nonaligned countries 
are important to the policies of two of the three countries and will con­
tinue to play a significant role, however, the increasing politization of 
the nonaligned movement is viewed unfavorably by all the states.
As has been demonstrated, Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia did become 
increasingly independent of the Soviets during Leonid Brezhnev’s tenure in 
office (1964-1982), Yugoslavia and Albania had already become independent 
and Romania was beginning to assert itself when Brezhnev entered office,
■ytj* policies of the three diverged from the Sovit? upon numerous occasions, 
yet each avoided being recipients of Soviet wrath. Each pursued a separate 
foreign policy, while Albania broke with and Romania distanced itself from 
the WTO and Romania and Yugoslavia became increasingly active in the Third 
World and the nonaligned movement. The years immediately proceeding 
Brezhnev’s death saw a greatly reduced level of overt autonomous moves, but 
they continued nonetheless. Whether ’’growing independence" can remain a 
valid statement will depend to a large degree on how the internal composi­
tion of the four actors (the three plus the Soviet Union) changes in the 
next few years. The heyday of activism and autonomy of the late 60s to
mid^seveoties slowed as new ideas were considered and alternative paths 
were sought. The possibility of n wild surge in independent moves seems 
unlikely in the near future because of the uncertainty of the present.
A quiet, steady continuation of the present policies, however, appears 
to be the road which will be taken in the coming hears*
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